An Address made by Dr. Felice Ferrero in answer to Mr. V. R. Savic at a Luncheon organized by the League for Free Nations.
In order clearly to understand the Italian position in the so-called Adriatic question, we must state first what is the real political status at present of the Jugo-Slavs. This point has been brought out already several times in the press, but it is necessary to insist upon it because it has a good deal of bearing upon the whole question. As you doubtless know, the Jugo-Slav state does not exist; neither the United States, nor Great Britain, nor France, nor Italy, have recognized the Jugo-Slav state, although they have all expressed their sympathy with the Jugo-Slav aspirations. The Jugo-Slavs accuse Italy of being the real obstacle to such recognition and it is quite possible that such is the fact, but we shall see that there are many very good reasons for it.
As things now stand, we have the old kingdom of Serbia, which is one of the Allies and will be represented at the peace conference. On the other hand we have a group of populations composed of Slovenes, Croats, Bosnians, Herzegovinians and Dalmatians who are part of an enemy country; who to the effects of international law are still an enemy population, and who are waiting for the peace congress to decide what shall be done with them. In this decision they, as well as the other parts of the Austro-German Empire dr, Germany, have no voice at all. It is for us, the Allied countries, and more precisely for the four Great Powers, to say what their fate shall be. There is no doubt that the verdict of the congress of peace will be that those people, in so far as they make up a compact national unit, shall join their Serbian kinsmen to form a greater state therein to enjoy a full national life, if their internal quarrels will allow. When, however, it comes to territories, where such people do not form a compact national unit, but are mixed with Italian populations, that is to say, to the Adriatic provinces, the question as to what should be done with such regions is already settled by the all too famous and much abused Treaty of London.
Validity of Treaty of London
Before I go any further into the discussion of the Treaty of London, I should like to indulge in a few general considerations concerning the reception that the treaty has been given in the world at large. The Jugo-Slav agitators in this country and in Europe would like to give the impression that the treaty is null and void because it was a secret treaty, and this being the dawn of the wonderful era of democracy and people's brotherhood, secret treaties are not allowed. I should like to call your attention to the fact that, so far, such view has been expressed officially only by the Premier of Serbia and the Premier of Greece, two countries in which, as is unfortunately the case of most Balkanic countries, political good faith is usually held in very low esteem. As a matter of fact the treaty still exists and none of the signing powers have expressed any intention of not honoring it. The Minister of Foreign Affairs in Great Britain, Mr. Balfour, has solemnly declared in Parliament that any treaty bearing the signature of the British Government is sacred to Great Britain; and no opposition has arisen on the part of the French Government, although the Jugo-Slavs, by the very reprehensible game of stirring up ill feelings between allies in favor of an enemy, have succeeded in creating a certain current in their favor in part of the press of all countries.
As for the United States, it is futile to say that the fact that it was not a party to the compact makes it free to help the cause of the enemy Croatians against allied Italy. If my information is correct the United States was informed of the existence of the treaty when it entered the war and raised no objection to it; then actually implicitly accepted it by sending troops to the Italian front. The number of American troops at the Italian front was, it is true, quite small; but again, if I am correctly informed, the American Government had decided to send, and Secretary Baker had ordered, very large contingents to the Italian front, when the order was suspended and withdrawn because of certain opposition which for the moment I need not discuss further, as this is not quite pertinent to the subject in hand.
It is rather unpleasant to have to remind people of a debt of honor, because such things are supposed to be unnecessary among gentlemen. If anyone will say that, circumstances having changed, the signatures of France and England are no longer good, I shall not argue the question with him. I shall remind him that the war which devastated Europe was possible only because of an act of international bad faith on the part of Germany, which alone brought the intervention of England in the war; and also that the cause of the entrance of the United States in the war was not, as people often say, the championship of any principles of democracy but again an act of international bad faith on the part of Germany in not keeping her submarine agreement. International laws and relations are based on good faith, as there is no other possible force to enact international agreements; and it would be a sad league of nations, indeed, or a poor peace, indeed, that would begin with such an act of bad faith as the violation of a treaty.
The Slav's Threat of War
The Serbian and Jugo-Slav agitators would like to have us believe that a settlement of the Adriatic question according to the Treaty of London would mean certain war in the future; in fact, they threaten us with war to the knife if we dare to think of it. I am quite sure that the Jugo-Slavs and their friends need not worry about possibilities of war. This peace, like every other peace, will have the germs of the next war in it, no matter what we do. Without going any further, Alsace-Lorraine will be sufficient excuse for a powerful Germany of the future to start trouble whenever she feels strong enough for it, not only because of national claims, but because of the very important fact that the transfer of Lorraine to France will have given to France the best iron deposits of Germany and 80 percent of the total iron production of Europe. And the rivalries of the small states which are rising all through Eastern and Central Europe, making of it an immense Balkanic peninsula, will be enough to give food for thought and occupation for armies for centuries to come, unless some way can be found of keeping them down.
The threat of war on the part of Premier Vestnich, of Serbia, strikes me as either funny or pitiful, according to the point of view. We know very well that Serbia has a little army left — the army which Italy saved for her after the tragic retreat of Albania by transferring it to Corfu and then to Salonica — but it might be well to remind the Premier that all the manhood of military age of Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia and of Slovenia is held prisoner in Italy, and that Italy has been supplied by the collapse of the Austrian army, which was made up of one-third of Croatians, with enough guns, ammunitions, horses, motor trucks, airplanes, gasolene and ships to keep in order for a long time to come not only little Serbia, but greater Serbia, or a fellow many times her size. But the threat seems to me too absurd to consider it further, even as a jest.
Conciliatory Faction in Italy
The Treaty of London, then, stands as it is. The intemperance, however, of the Jugo-Slavs in putting forth their claims has stirred up a counter current of nationalism in Italy which goes much beyond the limits of the Treaty of London and claims, besides Fiume, the whole of Dalmatia, and, beyond, Ragusa and Cattaro. I should not be surprised if these claims were recognized by the peace congress, and if so, the Jugo-Slavs will have only to thank their own work for it.
The Jugo-Slavs and their friends tried to make much of the fact of supposed dissension in the Italian public concerning the Treaty of London. The party of conciliation with the Jugo-Slavs, which the Jugo-Slavs have very wrongly interpreted as a party of renunciation, is headed by the Corriere della Sera of Milan. Inasmuch as I have belonged to the editorial staff of the Corriere since my college graduation and I am still connected with it, I may claim the privilege of giving you some exact information as to what the polemics started by the Corriere last fall exactly mean in this matter. The Corriere and its followers never meant to abandon the claims of Italy to Trieste, Gorizia, Gradisca and Istria; lately the Corriere has added Fiume to the claims of Italy, about which no discussion is even admitted. The Corriere said, however, that in view of the evident advantages of conciliation and friendly relations with the neighboring Slav state-to-be, it might be advisable to compromise on the question of Dalmatia by allowing the Croatians to control Dalmatia on condition, however, that the necessary guarantees be given for the protection of the Italian element living there. That was all.
And this is also the standpoint that I have supported in this country, strenuously enough to bring upon my head, on the part of the Italian press, the accusation of being a pro-Slav; but I must sincerely confess that given the tone of the Jugo-Slav agitation, I very much fear that no matter what the Italians might be willing to concede for the sake of conciliation, no conciliation is possible, and I doubt very much besides whether the arrangement suggested by this conciliatory party would be of any greater satisfaction to the Croatians than the intransigent behavior of Minister Sonnino. This party of conciliation, in fact, would require, as I said, absolute guarantees for the Italian element in Dalmatia, failing which they would approve of armed intervention to secure them.
And this is also the standpoint that I have supported in this country, strenuously enough to bring upon my head, on the part of the Italian press, the accusation of being a pro-Slav; but I must sincerely confess that given the tone of the Jugo-Slav agitation, I very much fear that no matter what the Italians might be willing to concede for the sake of conciliation, no conciliation is possible, and I doubt very much besides whether the arrangement suggested by this conciliatory party would be of any greater satisfaction to the Croatians than the intransigent behavior of Minister Sonnino. This party of conciliation, in fact, would require, as I said, absolute guarantees for the Italian element in Dalmatia, failing which they would approve of armed intervention to secure them.
Since the Croatians of Dalmatia, short of a miracle, are not to be depended upon to respect other nationalities, as I shall show you later on the basis of documents, this would mean a clash between Italy and the future Jugo-Slav state within a very few years, and with such prospect in view I think it would be a safer proceeding to settle the matter now along the clearer, if apparently stiffer, lines of the Sonnino program.
Pact of Rome
There has been a tendency on the part of the Jugo-Slavs toward accusing Italy of, let us say, forgetfulness, because of that Pact of Rome of last winter which was supposed to have established an agreement between Italy and Slavs. I shall say, however, that that Pact of Rome expressly excluded any question of territorial boundaries and simply formulated a program of action by which the oppressed nationalities of Austria should co-operate in the destruction of the Austrian Empire. This was accomplished, but it is regrettable to say that while all the other oppressed nationalities did their part, the Croatians, Bosnians, Herzegovinians, Slovenes and Dalmatians did not; they fought with the Austrian Empire and for the Austrian Empire until the last, running out of the house and seeking shelter in the bosom of the Allies only when they heard the timbers of the roof crash over their heads. Under the circumstances, little consideration is due to them for the results.
And now let us examine very briefly the arrangements of the Treaty of London, as far as they apply to the Adriatic. There are two separate parts of the Adriatic provinces which the Treaty of London gives to Italy; one is the northern part including Gorizia, Gradisca, Carinthia, part of Carniola, Trieste and Istria — to these now Fiume has added itself by its own plebiscite. The other is Dalmatia.
As far as the first part is concerned, I beg to state that no differences of opinion exist in the mind of any Italian; that part is occupied, will be retained, and no discussion is at all admitted by any Italian party of any kind. Only as a matter of extreme courtesy, I will allow myself to take up a few arguments which may be of interest in this question.
Population of Disputed Area
The reason why Italy insists on the possession of these regions is twofold. First, because the country is inhabited by a large Italian population, amounting to about one-half of the total, which has been long persecuted and oppressed by Austria, especially through the medium of the Slovene population. It might be of interest to you to know that irredentism in Trieste is a matter of comparatively recent times. ... With the advance of Italy toward the East and the freeing from Austrian dominion of Lombardy and Venice, Austria entirely reversed its policy and began a most determined attempt to stifle the Italian character of Trieste and neighboring countries by helping and encouraging the national invasion of the Slovene population. A state of political tension followed which I shall describe later, and resulted in a Slovene oppression of the Italian city and the development of a powerful feeling of irredentism in its Italian population.
The case of Fiume is even more conspicuous, as Fiume has always been a free city strongly animated by feelings of local freedom. The irredentism of Fiume which led to its declaration of union with Italy practically dates from the declaration of the war and the regime of violence which under the protection of the Austrian Government was instituted in the city by the Croatian element. Such feeling is now so strong that the Mayor of Fiume solemnly declared in Rome that should Fiume be assigned by the peace conference to Croatia, the entire population of Fiume would rather migrate than stay, and other officials of the city, not constrained by the necessity of keeping parliamentary language, put it more bluntly by saying that the Fiumans would rather go to hell than be with Croatia.
A curious thing is to be noted here. I said that the population of those regions is about half Italian and half Slav. According to the Slavic figures it is exactly 439,413 Slavs and 354,595 Italians. It must be remarked, however, that these figures are based on a revised census of 1910 for the city of Trieste — an interesting instance, this, which I shall explain to you later — the first census taken that year giving Trieste 24,000 more Italians and therefore 24,000 fewer Slavs — that is with a shift of 48,000 in the proportions of the two parts of the population. This shift would bring the total Slav population down to 415,000, and the total Italian up to 378,000. If we add to these 35,000 Italians and the 10,000 Slavs of Fiume, we should reach the final figures of 413,000 Italians against 425,000 Slavs, which figure, however, includes a few thousand Germans and Hungarians of Trieste, Fiume and Pola. In other words, the population is about equally divided.
The curious thing is that the Jugo-Slavs and their friends, while they accuse Italy of imperialism for its intention to incorporate 425,000 Slavs in this region, apparently think nothing of the fact that the Jugo-Slavs would like to include 413,000 Italians in their own territory.
The facts on which the whole question of the population hinges, Italians and Jugo-Slavs substantially agree upon. The Jugo-Slavs admit that the majority of the cities is Italian, and the Italians agree that the majority of the country[side] population is Slav; in what exact proportions it really does not matter. We also agree that it is practically impossible to separate the cities and the hinterland. The question then is: shall the cities go with the country, or the country with the cities? In the world of hypothesis the Italian claim that the country must go with the cities is as good as the Slav claim that the cities must go with the country.
Frontier Question
But the Italians have some other and better reasons in their favor, chief of which is the protection of their frontiers. By extending the boundaries to the main divide of the Alps in Southern Tyrol and in the East, Italy has secured for herself absolute protection against any possibility of foreign invasion. The war has proved that no army, no matter how powerful, can cross a well defended mountain chain. The Russians failed in the Carpathians, the French and Germans failed respectively in the Vosges, the Austrians failed on the Trentino side of Italy and the Italians failed on the eastern side. The only chance for the invasion that devastated part of Italy for a year was exactly through the open door of the East. You may rest assured that Italy, having now conquered by force of arms, the eastern door to her house, will not relinquish it.
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Suppression of Italians in Dalmatia
As to Dalmatia, the story is a little bit different, but only apparently so. It is true that the overwhelming majority of the population is Croatian, with the exception of the city of Zara, which is Italian-note the curious fact that the capital of a Slavic province has remained Italian in spite of all things done to change it but it will not be amiss to remember that Dalmatia was for three centuries part of the Republic of Venice, that from 1815 to 1866, during the first part of the Austrian occupation, Dalmatia was still connected with the provinces of Lombardy and Venice, that Italian was the official language of the courts, of all public offices and of the schools. Until about 1870 Italians and Slavs in Dalmatia lived in very good harmony, the Slavs accepting the influence of Italian civilization, going to Padua and not to Agram [Zagreb] for their college studies, and generally recognizing the historical necessity of the Italian character of Dalmatia.
It might interest you to know that Nicolò Tommaseo, a Dalmatian who wrote (in Italian) a lyric to the Greater Serbia which would come in the future, and who became one of the greatest grammarians of Italy, wrote in 1837 the following lines to Cesare Cantù: “I am Italian because I was born of Venetian subjects, because my first language was Italian, because my great-grandmother's father came to Dalmatia from the valleys of Bergamo. Dalmatia virtually is more Italian than Bergamo, and I at heart am more Italian than Italy.” And let me also quote from a Croatian newspaper of Spalato, the Nase Jedinsto of December, 1910: “We no longer study Italian and great is the danger that comes from this, especially among the young people.”
Affairs changed in Dalmatia, at the same time as in the north and for the same reason, in about 1870, and in the new generations of Croatians, helped and egged on by the Austrian Government, grew the fierce, almost savage, spirit of aggressive nationalism that had only one program: destroy everything, and with all means, that was not Croatian. With the help of the Government they suppressed Italian as the official language in offices, they suppressed the Italian schools, they suppressed the Italian courts, they even forced Italians that have to do with courts to stand proceedings in Croatian without any interpreter, and to have all documents concerning property, like mortgages, transfers, etc., written and registered in Croatian. It is a very easy argument, of course, on the part of the Croatians to say that we must deal with conditions as they are now and not as they were. That is the comfortable argument by which Germany tried to persuade the world that the occupation of Belgium was no longer to be discussed; but it is not unnatural that many in Italy should want not only to recall a past which dates back only about forty years—about the time of the Alsace-Lorraine occupation-h also investigate the methods with which some of the results of the present day have been achieved. I do not see, therefore, that the matter of the present make-up of the population of Dalmatia should be any obstacle to the Italian occupation.
Italy, on the other hand, has some important reasons, also of a military nature, for the occupation of those lands, and especially of Sebenico, which is the best harbor of the Adriatic after Cattaro. Slavs accuse Italy of wanting to make of the Adriatic an Italian lake. That, however, is not the idea of Italy. What Italy wants to do is to make the Adriatic a sea in which there is no foreign navy to threaten her coasts, nor any possibility of such a foreign navy being developed; with the occupation of the harbors of Pola, Sebenico, possibly Cattaro, and the control of the entrance to the Adriatic through the occupation of Valona, such result is very definitely and positively obtained. “But whoever threatens Italy?” say our Croatian neighbors, who alternately play the role of the lamb and the lion according to the effect desired. The Croatians with their Serbian friends have struck such a belligerent tone that any measure of protection on the part of Italy would be, by this very fact, justified in the eyes of all peoples.
The Russian Peril
That is not all. We come here to a very interesting argument, which has to do with the present situation of of Central and Eastern Europe and the possibilities of their future. For one thing I read in the book of my esteemed opponent, Vladislav R. Savic, the following passage: “It is of no small concern to Italy and the world which road the future Russian policy will take; will she develop like a sincere, broad-minded, peaceful and tolerant democracy, or be eaten by the cancerous desire of world domination? ... In vain Italians would say tomorrow that imperial Russia had consented to their occupation of those Slav lands ... Unable to hinder the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, Prince Gorchakov, at the Congress of Berlin is reported to have said to Count Andrassy: 'Well, go in, but Bosnia and Herzegovina will prove to be the tomb of Austria-Hungary. Are the words of Prince Gorchakov to Count Andrassy no warning to Italy?'”
Here we see our Jugo-Slav neighbors threatening us the resurrection and the vengeance of Russia. But, gentlemen, the possibility of Russia's reaching the Adriatic shore through the lands of the Southern Slavs, acting either as her allies or as her vassals, was exactly one of the reasons that prompted the claims of Italy at the time of the Treaty of London, a reason which the contracting parties then and most writers now acknowledged to be very good. The danger is then still impending, it seems. Why should the Italian policy change, then, if such is the condition?
But there is something more that I should like to call to your attention.
Revival of Austrian Empire
The Jugo-Slavs will be a small power and to Italy, at least, an inoffensive state, it is said. Granted. But there is something behind and beyond the Jugo-Slav state that must be considered. I have recently, in a statement to the press, accused the Croatians of making Austrian propaganda by their trying to stir up trouble and ill feeling among the Allies. This, gentlemen, is not idle talk, is not chasing of spooks. The revival of the Austrian Empire in the original form, only enlarged, is far from being a remote contingency. We heard a few days ago President Masaryk of Czecho-Slovakia openly declare that one of the purposes of the foreign policy of Czecho-Slovakia would be the formation of a Danube Confederation, to which the Germans of Austria will be also admitted, if they so desire, the center and directing power of such federation to be in Prague. Gentlemen, this is nothing more and nothing less than Austria as it was, with the addition of Serbia; the only difference being the ingenuous belief of President Masaryk that if the Germans of Austria are admitted to the confederation, the Slavs of Czecho-Slovakia could even for one moment retain the controlling position in the confederation as against the active organizing and executive powers of the Germans of Vienna.
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To come now to a conclusion, the situation is really a very simple one. It is not possible to dispose of the Adriatic coast without putting Slavs under Italian control or Italians under Slav control; it is only a matter of who should get first consideration. That Italy has the right to this first consideration is something that very few people will doubt in view of the facts and of the considerations already stated. I have been myself a partisan of the conciliatory policy suggested by the Corriere della Sera, as I stated before, and in this sense I have spoken at Columbia, at City College of New York, in cities outside of New York, and have written on many occasions; but I fear me that in view of the attitude assumed by our Croatian enemies, and I regret to add by our Serbian friends, a conciliation will be It difficult to reach. very seems to me that the cry which the Jugo-Slavs are trying to pass for the exultant voice of a new-born nation is nothing more than the ugly growl of a dog who sees a fat chunk of meat taken away from him and knows besides that the big stick of his master is no longer there to defend him in the enjoyment of his improperly acquired meat. I still hope against hope, but I must say the Adriatic question is a question that concerns Italy and the Jugo-Slavs — nobody else — and the next move for a good understanding must come from the Jugo-Slav side and in the proper frame of mind, that is of modesty and repentance; as far as I know Italy has done everything that she could do.
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