Removal of Italian Street Signs in Capodistria: Slovenia Continues to Erase Italian Heritage in Istria

Capodistria, Istria — Old Italian City

In Capodistria (Koper in Slovene), the ancient Italian odonyms are disappearing. Signs bearing the old Italian names of the streets are being removed. The operation, ordered by the Chief Inspector of Media and Culture in Slovenia, is already underway in the city's streets and squares.


Historical Background

The city of Capodistria, today the capital of the northern part of Istria annexed to Slovenia in 1991 (and now renamed ‘Koper’), was historically an Italian city. From its foundation by the ancient Romans in 128 BC up until the middle of the 20th century, Capodistria was inhabited by a Romance population which spoke Latin, Venetian and Italian. The city remained always linked culturally and politically to Italy: Roman Italy, medieval Kingdom of Italy, Republic of Venice, Patriarch of Aquileia, modern Kingdom of Italy.

It was at Risano, a settlement near Capodistria, in the year 804 AD, that the local population of Istria and Trieste held an assembly and issued the Placito del Risano (Placitum of Risano), in which they refused to allow foreign Slavic peoples to intrude upon their land.

In the 18th century the city of Capodistria gave birth to Gian Rinaldo Carli, an early advocate of Italian unification and author of ‘La Patria degli Italiani’ (“The Fatherland of the Italians”). It was the birthplace of Nazario Sauro, an Italian sailor and patriot executed by the Austrians during World War I. From here sprang the famous physician Santorio Santorio, the painter Francesco Trevisani, the theologian Pier Paolo Vergerio and the Italian general Vittorio Italico Zupelli. It was also the place of origin of Ioannis Kapodistrias (Giovanni Capodistria), a Venetian noble and statesman who would later become the first leader of Greece.

According to the 1910 Austro-Hungarian census – despite being notoriously biased against the Italians – the city of Capodistria was nearly 88% Italian and less than 5% Slovene.

The demographics of Capodistria in the early 20th century were as follows:

1900
7,205 Italians (86.5%)
391 Slovenes (4.7%)
167 Serbo-Croats (2%)
67 Germans (0.8%)

1910
7,909 Italians (87.9%)
445 Slovenes (4.9%)
154 Serbo-Croats (1.7%)
66 Germans (0.7%)

1921
8,432 Italians (97.7%)
91 Slovenes (1%)
2 Serbo-Croats (0%)

1945
5,554 Italians (90.3%)
582 Slovenes (9.4%)

13 Serbo-Croats (0.2%)

The native Italian inhabitants were forced out of this land after World War II, when the territory was occupied by the Yugoslav Communists. This event is known as the Istrian Exodus or Julian-Dalmatian Exodus. Approximately 93% of Capodistria's Italian population (14,000 of 15,000 including the city and surrounding district) was forced into exile; others were killed in the Foibe Massacres – a genocide and ethnic cleansing of Italians carried out by the Yugoslavs during and after the war. The city was subsequently repopulated by immigrant colonists coming from other areas of Yugoslavia, i.e. present-day Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia.

There is still an Italian minority (formerly a majority) which lives in Capodistria today. Their rights and heritage are supposed to be respected, protected and preserved, in accordance with modern democratic principles and international agreements. But in countries like Slovenia these principles mean nothing, especially with regard to the historical Italian population of Istria.


Removal of Italian Street Signs (2024)

Slovene municipal employee
overturning an Italian street
sign in Capodistria

According to a report by Radio Capodistria (rtvslo.si – August 23, 2024), the street signs in Capodistria bearing the ancient Italian odonymns are being removed by the Slovene government.

The Slovene Inspectorate of Culture and Media, led by Sonja Trančar, made the decision. All signs written only in the Italian language must be removed. The municipal employees have already begun taking down the Italian street signs. The first sign to be removed was the one in Via del Porto (Porto Street), near the Muda Gate – an Italian Renaissance archway built by the Venetians in the 16th century. Operations are now underway in Via della Calegaria (Calegaria Street) and in the next days will likely continue in other areas of the city.

These actions aroused the immediate protest of the Comunità Nazionale Italiana (CNI), the official organizational representative of the Italian national community in Slovenia. The deputy-mayor of Capodistria, Mario Steffè, who is a member of the Italian community, is likewise opposed to these resolutions.

According to a second report by Radio Capodistria (rtvslo.si – August 23, 2024), the Slovene mayor of the city, Aleš Bržan, did not fully comply with the order; instead, he has unilaterally opted for a sort of compromise: instead of removing the signs, he has ordered them to be turned backwards as form of “protest”, so that the signs remain but the Italian names are no longer visible.

The Slovene government interprets the law on the public use of the Slovenian language in a way which effectively nullifies the law that is supposed to guarentee the rights of indigenous minorities. The signs in Capodistria constitute a historical patrimony and memory of the old Italian names of streets and squares prior to the Yugoslav occupation. Inspector Trančar maintains that these signs violate Slovene nationality because they are written only in Italian. Additionally, it was previously reported that the Slovene clergy at St. Anne's Franciscan Friary (a former Italian convent) refused to display an Italian sign and demanded that the ancient Italian names be translated into Slovene, before the Inspectorate ordered their removal altogether. The Italian identity therefore is no longer welcome in Capodistria, even though this city was Latin and Italian for over 2,000 years.

The persecution of the Italian Istrians did not end with the war, and did not even cease with the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990's, nor with the entry of Slovenia into the European Union in 2004.

Unable to resort to outright violence or intimidation, the Slovenes manage to find new ways to eliminate the historical Italian character of Istria. In recent years there have been coordinated efforts to rebrand Italian port towns like Capodistria, Pirano, Isola and Portorose as “Slovene destinations” for tourists; local Istrian-Italian food products and cultural figures are assigned Slovene names; in 2018 they demolished the historical Palazzo Longo (after it had suffered decades of neglect); now they are removing the old Italian street signs, so that only the current Slovene names will remain.

Before and after the removal of the sign
Piazza del Duomo, Capodistria

Ever since the end of World War II and the annexation of these territories by Yugoslavia we have witnessed ethnic cleansing; expulsions; destruction of monuments; demolition of historic buildings; renaming of cities, towns, streets and squares; removal of Italian street names and signs; the Slavicization of Italian surnames; the re-writing of history books; the denial or rationalization of past crimes; nationalization and theft of historical Italian figures; appropriation of Italian heritage by tourist boards; provocative declarations by politicians; and revisionist campaigns across the Internet conducted by nationalists from post-Yugoslav countries who seek to suppress the Italian history of these regions.

These are the same people who still today cry about “Fascism” and “forced Italianization programs” from 100 years ago. Meanwhile, we are in 2024 and the only ones behaving like this are our Slavic brethren on the other side of the Adriatic, who for the last century have done the utmost to destroy and erase all traces of Italian culture and civilization in Istria and Dalmatia – a work which they still continue today. Anachronistic appeals to “Fascism” or “Italianization” are little more than manipulative political tools invoked by intellectually dishonest people to obfuscate and justify the intollerant and undemocratic behaviour of Balkan governments towards ethnic minorities, in particular towards the Italians who lived in these lands long before the Slavic peoples did. For decades they have painted themselves as innocuous victims of “Fascist aggression” in order to mask their own beligerance and hostilities against Italians which has persisted without cessation since the 19th century.

Slovenia is the first to object when Italy honors the Italian victims of the Foibe Massacres, because it offends Slovene sensibilities to be reminded of the horrors comitted by the Yugoslav Partisans. The Slovenes also object when Italian politicians call for an ethnic census to determine how many Slovenes live in Italy, so as to better understand whether or not the current policies make sense. The Slovenes are eager to object the moment any Italian citizen publicly says or does anything which can be vaguely interpreted as nationalistic, revanchist or sectarian. But in their own country the Slovenes behave as ferocious nationalists and identitarians; they do not grant the Italians in Istria the same rights or accomodations that they demand for the Slavic minorities in Italy.

While the Republic of Italy bends over backwards to cater to its ethnic minorities, often at the expense of its own Italian citizens and national interests, strictly enforcing bilingualism in schools, signage in minority languages and putting strong emphasis on a ‘multicultural’ narratation of local Italian history, the Republic of Slovenia instead carries on the national tradition of ethnocide, historical revisionism, cultural appropriation and forced Slavicization.

See also:

The Placitum of Risano

Historical Timeline of Istria

The President of Slovenia Falsifies History: The Tragicomic Case of Ioannis Kapodistrias

The Destruction of Palazzo Longo in Capodistria

German Saints Stolen by the Slovenes
Why do Some Countries Steal History and Heritage from Other Nations?

Horror in Slovenia: Over 3,000 Bodies Discovered

The Myth of Anti-Slavic Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans

Making Trieste Slavic: Ethnic Cleansing and the Attempted Slavicization of Trieste

The Forced Slavicization of Clergy and Liturgy in Julian Venetia and Dalmatia by the Habsburgs (1866-1914)
Foibe Massacres: Historical Disinformation Techniques

Foibe Monument in Marghera Vandalized by Communists

40 Days of Terror: The Yugoslav Occupation of Trieste
40 Days of Trieste: Slavs Celebrate a Communist Dictator

Why Italy and Dalmatia Must be United: Arguments at the Paris Peace Conference (1919)

The following document was presented at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and is conserved in “Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume I”, published in 1942 by the U.S. Department of State (DOS).

Preface

The many arguments which have been put forward in favor of Italy's right to extend its sovereignty over some strips of the eastern coast of the Adriatic are, by now, generally known. These arguments were an inducement for Italy to enter into the huge fight, which has raged over Europe for four years, and if, at the time they were the very objects of the war, their fulfillment ought to be today the reward for the tremendous sufferings which the country has undergone.

These arguments may be roughly divided in two classes: some of them appeal to sentiment, others are based upon facts. This distinction makes it clear that whilst some of our claims (those based on sentiment) although quite legitimate and fair could not, by themselves be strong enough as a deciding argument at the peace conference; others (those based on facts) represent such indispensable needs that failure to get these recognized would deprive Italy of the fruits of her great victory, would cripple her prospects, and definitely prejudice the possibility of a quiet and prosperous future, such as the new destinies indicated by this war offer to our race. This is why Italy cannot but insist on them.

Part I: Sentimental Reasons

Historical Reasons

Danielli in his book “Dalmatia” has thus epitomized the Italian character of Dalmatia at the end of his chapter on Dalmatian history:

“Already in the third century before Christ, did the Romans, then at war with the Carthaginians, understand how necessary it was to them to rule the Adriatic, and that in order to do so they needed to dominate its Eastern Coast. It was thus that after the end of the first Punic War they started in 229 B. C. the first of these ten Illyrian wars which in the year 78 B.C. brought the entire region East of the Adriatic under their rule.

The whole of Dalmatia belonged to Rome for nearly six centuries without interruption: it went then to the Italian Kingdom of Odoacre and to the Italian Kingdom of the Ostrogoths: and finally to the Empire of the East when Italy was reconquered. Venice had possession of the whole of it from the end of the XV century to the end of the XVIII century except for such temporary and partial losses which occurred in her struggles with the Turcs. Venice never gave up the islands and the towns on the Dalmatian coast not even during those short periods during which Dalmatia was partially Croat or Hungarian.

Only at the end of the XVIII century Dalmatia came under the rule of the Austrian Monarchy and only in as much as it was made an heir to the territory of the Venetian Republic. Dalmatia remained therefore even then all one with Italy. It was included in Napoleon's ephemeral Kingdom of Italy, from which it was only temporarily severed to form the provinces of Illyria. It then was restored unto Austria together with Venice and it is only from 1866 until today that it has existed politically severed from the Italian peninsula.

Therefore not only by nature art and civilisation, but also through its history, Dalmatia essentially pertains to Italy.”

Geographical Reasons

To summarize all the conditions orographical, hydrographical, geological, climatic, etc., which determine the geographical characteristics of Dalmatia would be beyond the scope of a short article. Such a study would involve a lengthy reference to numerous books dealing with the various aspects of this question and its consequences would be to show that even the Austrian and German geographical experts admit that indisputably Dalmatia belongs to Italy.

In this connection, a reference to Danielli's great book is of interest. On page 8 he thus expresses himself:

“Now Dalmatia both as regards its mainland and neighbouring isles consists of a low lying territory at the foot of the slopes descending from a high plateau. Thus its clearly defined characteristics which differentiate it from those of the interior of the continent have impelled all authorities, ancient and modern, Italian or alien, to affirm that Dalmatia is geographically a unit completely divorced from the remainder of the Balkan peninsula in spite of territorial continuity.”


Ethnical Reasons

Venetian Domination ended by the inclusion of these provinces in the “Serenissima” (i.e. Venetian Republic) of which they became the most solid bulwark containing the most loyal population. Language, religion, dress, buildings, all have testified during past centuries as they do today, to the fact that Dalmatia has become, as she is at present, absolutely Italian. Latin civilization spread itself from that country as far as Croatian, Hungarian and Turkish barbarism permitted; but none of these has ever been able to establish themselves on the Adriatic, which remained notwithstanding an Italian lake.

Then came on the scene Austria after the Treaty of Campoformio (1797). The moving episodes of this period, the profound grief of the population of Dalmatia, when the sacred Winged Lion of St. Mark was forced to yield to the two-headed eagle of the Hapsburgs, are related in history. But if the lion disappeared from the flags it remained imprinted in the monuments and hearts of the people! Dalmatia remained fundamentally and faithfully Italian.

To overcome this resistance but one course was open to Austria; this was to denationalize Dalmatia. The long odyssey of the Italians persecuted by officials in their homes, in their churches by a new semi-barbaric race, which urged on and favourised by Austria violently infiltrated itself and pushed aside the Italian elements, has been consecrated in literature.

And it should be emphasized that in Dalmatia, since the time of the Venetian Republic the Italians have retained control of the public offices, municipalities, learned professions, commerce and industry, in one word, they have been the dominating element in the intellectual life and commerce of the community, while manual and agricultural labour has always been left to a great extent to the Croatian and Slav elements, in a broad spirit of conciliation, civilization and colonization.

Under the astute Austrian policy artificial Slavo-Croat immigration, which was started towards 1848 and reached its maximum after 1860, was encouraged by every means available, while an underhand contest was conducted aiming at the exclusion of the Italians from public positions and from the moral and intellectual status which they had held during centuries past.

Such a policy necessarily resulted in an increase of the number of the Slavs and a diminution in that of the Italians. Austrian statistics are falsified and ingeniously exaggerated to the detriment of Italian interest. According to what they quote in 1865 there were 384,000 Serbo-Croats as against 55,000 Italians, while according to the last Austro-Hungarian official statistics the total Dalmatian population would be of about 627,000 inhabitants of whom only about 20,000 Italians.

In the Dalmatian “capitanati” included within the armistice line the total population is of 294,900 inhabitants, which includes 280,900 Slavs or Slav-speaking folk, viz. the Morlacchi [1] amounting to about 93,000 and 14,000 Italians. In the “capitanati” not comprised within the same line on a total population of 333,000 inhabitants, 329,000 would be Slavs or Slav-speaking people (viz. the 100,000 Morlacchi) and 4,000 Italians.

[1] Note 1: These Morlacchi are of purely Romanic and Latin race, like the Kutzo-Walachians of Pindus, who have such a pronounced national physiognomy. The most rigorous impartial ethnological studies demonstrate that this population is not Slav, as the Slavs themselves differentiate them from themselves and from the Italians.

The arbitrary proceedings and the systematic falsification of the official statistics at the disadvantage of the Italian element are well known; it is likewise notorious that the latter element, following the most recent and accredited demographic investigations, is composed of over 80,000 inhabitants. The official figures ought to be accordingly rectified as follows:

In the Dalmatian “capitanati” included within the armistice line there would be about 93,000 Morlacchi and 56,000 Italians against 145,000 Slavs; in the “capitanati” not included within the above mentioned line there would be about 100,000 Morlacchi and 29,000 Italians against 204,000 Slavs properly speaking.

Besides, even if we admit the diminution of the Italian elements in the population shown by the Austro-Hungarian statistics, we should still ask ourselves this question: Does immigration, when, in a given region, it results in a majority over the pre-existing population necessarily confer the rights of sovereignty on the new-comers? The answer is, yes, perhaps when the case involves countries sparsely inhabitated by barbaric races, or belonging to a civilisation definitely inferior, that is, when immigration presents the characteristics of a real and effective colonization, but certainly not if the case is one of a race of a civilization inferior to that of the population of the territory in question, even if the latter is in the minority; certainly not if the said minority keeps all its own national characteristics and finds itself strong enough to infuse these in the majority, by process of assimilation; when it keeps and spreads its own language and control of its industry, its commerce, retains its civil powers and carries on nearly exclusively learned professions.

Far less should such an immigration confer rights, when it is the result not of a natural and necessary expansion but is the outcome of political phenomena and of the policy of an unnatural government.

The nature of the very recent proceedings, which are causing the Italians to renounce their nationality may be gathered from the reports received of the action taken against our compatriots at Spalato, at Sebenico and at other places by the newly appointed successors to the sovereignty of Austria.


Moral Reasons

Is it possible that Europe will agree to denying to victorious Italy the fruits of their great victory? Is it possible that after so much blood has been freely shed that the reward for which she so valiantly staked her existence should be taken away from her? Is it possible that, in compliance with the principles set forth by Wilson, a formula could be found to condemn a race, even if numerically reduced, to be subject to the rule of a civilization still semi-barbaric, while that race claims a millenium of Latin civilization?

The Italian minority is merely a fruit of methodical coercion carried on by means of prisons and gallows, of systematic expropriation, of unending persecution conducted with bureaucratic methods zealously applied by a brutal police.

After the enforcement of the notorious Language Ordinance, which in 1912 eliminated the Italian Language from public offices in Dalmatia, nothing remained to complete the political destruction of the Italians.

In conclusion we feel confident that in the case of Dalmatia, the questions of this artificial and enforced immigration of Slavs and of the violent methods adopted towards the Italians, will receive the same consideration as will the analogous problems of Alsace-Lorraine.

Part II: Arguments Based on Facts

Military Geographical Arguments

In order thoroughly to understand the extremely poor strategical and tactical situation which nature has provided for Italy on the western coast of the Adriatic, it is useful to recall some geographical features which cannot be modified by art, craftsmanship or human will.

On the eastern coast there is a wonderful advanced barrier of reefs and islands which, like an impassable screen, protect the mainland and the lines of communication along the coast. On the western coast there is a low beach undefended and exposed to aggression and invasion of every kind. On the east navigation in still waters is possible no matter from what quarter the wind blows; on the west there is no shelter and sailing becomes difficult and risky as soon as ever the sea gets rough. On the east, harbours, wide recesses and good anchorage are to be found anywhere; on the west, landing is generally impossible and it is difficult for ships to find a haven or a shelter.

On the east, the coast rises in cliffs each of which is a splendid observation post dominating a wide surface; on the west, the land (with the exception of Gargano and Conero) lies absolutely flat and low and any far-reaching observation on the sea is impossible except through aviation, which, however, can only be active under favourable weather conditions.

On the east, the sea is clear and deep and mines can be used with difficulty; on the west, the waters are muddy and shallow and seem made on purpose to favour the terribly insidious work of submarine weapons.

On the east, there is every favourable condition for torpedo boats and submarines to lie in ambush, while on the west, the coast is so flat and straight as to exclude even the possibility of any stealth. Even marine currents are favourable to the Dalmatian coast, since they move from south to north along the eastern coast of the Adriatic; on reaching the Ancona parallel they turn from east to west and wind again southwards along our coast. Consequently, any mine which is torn from its anchorage or thrown into the current on the eastern coast is automatically brought to us to cause death and destruction.

At daybreak when the light dawns on a fleet which may have crossed the Adriatic in the dark with a view to attacking the opposite coast, any ships coming from the west would be blinded by the rising sun and find the high eastern coast still entirely clad in darkness, whilst a fleet coming from the east would have the sun at its back and thus be in an ideal position as far as the light is concerned, while the Italian coast would lie helpless before her under the rising sun. An eastern fleet, always screened by islands, unseen and protected from any attack, can transfer her ships from north to south or viceversa from Pola to Cattaro, i.e. along the greater part of the Adriatic coast, sheltered from mines and submarines, whilst the Italian fleet, on leaving Brindisi, is immediately sighted and can be chased, completely unsheltered, up to Venice.

Military Strategical Arguments

1) Italy possess only two naval harbours in the Adriatic, i.e. Brindisi in the south and Venice in the north; they are 750 kilometres apart, and neither of them could hold a large fleet. The geographical structure of the coast between those two points prevents the building of a large central naval harbour.

It is consequently impossible for the Italian fleet in the Adriatic to keep together in one anchorage according to sound strategical principles (as for instance in the case of the British Fleet at Scapa Flow, or the French Fleet at Corfu) but her fleet must be divided between Brindisi and Venice, with some ships even at the outside port of Taranto which is not in the Adriatic at all.

This is not entirely due to lack of space at the naval bases in the Adriatic above referred to, but also to the fact that if the whole of the fleet were gathered at Brindisi, it could not, on account of the distance, reach the northern Adriatic in time to prevent an enemy attack against the coast, and likewise, if it were gathered in Venice, it would be impossible to reach the southern coast in time. In both cases a fleet belonging to the nation possessing the eastern coast of the Adriatic could always have a free choice both of time and place for an attack; this could be carried out and the fleet could then retire in good time behind the splendid barrier of Dalmatian reefs and isles before the Italian fleet could reach the spot and deliver battle.

2) The Italian Fleet being necessarily split up between Brindisi and Venice, the enemy in possession of the central part of the Dalmatian shore from Zara to Spalato, including Sebenico's splendid naval harbour, could at any time come out into the open sea to deliver battle. The Italian Fleet coming partly from Venice and partly from Brindisi would then necessarily be compelled to meet with only one part of its forces the whole of the enemy's ships, and would be obliged to accept battle before being able tactically to join the rest of its forces.

Hence ensues the absolute naval submission of the western coast fleet to the fleet from the east coast. Such submission could be expressed as follows: “it would be impossible to attack the eastern fleet on the open sea under equal conditions” or else: “it would be impossible to avoid the strategical and tactical superiority of the enemy even if, on the whole, he were numerically inferior.”

3) Even if, at the expense of many milliards, Italy should decide to make Venice and Brindisi into naval bases, each roomy enough to harbour a large fleet, and if after having done so, she should decide to develop her Adriatic Fleet and make it double the enemy's fleet in the same sea, even then, she would have no possibility of forcing the enemy to battle on equal conditions. In fact, whilst the enemy's fleet, on reaching the Italian coast is at any time in a condition to bombard thickly-peopled cities, to break up railways and roads, telegraphic, telephonic and optical connections, to prevent movement of troops towards the north during mobilisation, possibly to land small bodies of troops, and having done so, to retire to its base; on the contrary, the Italian fleet, on reaching the eastern coast would meet a barrier of reefs, isles and mined channels which form an inviolable line of defence of the enemy's mainland, and which screen and protect any shifting of the enemy's fleet northwards or southwards, thus enabling him either to avoid the battle or to issue from the North or South from behind the defensive barrier, attacking the Italian fleet from the back on the open sea, cutting it off from its base and keeping up the battle long enough to bring it near to exhaustion. That is to say, it would be impossible to reach by an attack either the enemy's coast or the enemy's fleet, and it would also be impossible to get back in time to our bases if the enemy should decide to prevent it.

Without any further consideration, it appears plainly that “in regard to the naval problem the possibility of absolutely mastering the strategical situation belongs to him who possesses the eastern coast of the Adriatic.” Italy will never feel secure in the Adriatic unless she can at least obtain possession of the central part of Dalmatia and its protecting and adjoining isles.

Only this possession will enable her:

a) to protect the central part of the Italian coast from Brindisi to Venice, enabling her fleet to be on the spot in time before the enemy should reach it either from the North or from the South.

b) to prevent the enemy from moving freely and secretly southwards or northwards behind a barrier of isles, without emerging into the open sea, should he intend avoid a battle.

c) to attack the enemy on his coasts, on his line of communication, to disturb his mobilisation movements from South to North, either on sea or on land, if operations should compel him to carry his troops towards the northeastern Italian frontier.

d) to reverse the present naval strategical situation which enables the enemy to have his fleet all on one spot wherever he pleases, and compels Italy to have hers split up in the places apart and very far from each other; allowing Italy, therefore, to have her fleet all on one spot in the centre of the Adriatic whilst compelling the enemy to split his forces partly towards the north and partly towards the south. We need consider the possibility that owing to the latest development of modern naval warfare, large ships may disappear, thus rendering useless large fleets and large naval bases. Torpedo boats, submarines, motor boats, light ships and all else which has combined to substitute insidious naval warfare for the classical battle on the seas, have only one object, i.e. the destruction of a fleet; if big ships cease to exist all means of an attack on big ships would also automatically disappear; they would be transformed and used as weapons against the enemy's maritime trade.

But even if the whole problem did only consist in insidious warfare, what would ever be the position of the nation possessing a flat and low coastline, with no protection, with shallow waters readily mined, with no isles, as against the nation disposing of a wonderful maze of shelters of all kinds, of numberless channels, of first class observation points scattered all over, of deep waters, havens safe against any sea, and where sailing is possible in still waters whatever may be the weather? If insidious warfare should substitute surface warfare, more than ever would Italy's position of inferiority be obvious and unbearable as against the position of the nation possessing the eastern coast of the Adriatic.

Neither is it correct to consider that the heirs on the Adriatic to the Austrian Kingdom have no fleet at present, nor that they have no intention of building one in the near future. By the Campoformio and Luneville Treaties Napoleon had imposed on Austria the neutralization of the Adriatic. This did not prevent Austria from being, sixty years later, a naval power, capable of conducting a successful naval campaign. The same might happen again notwithstanding any present promise. But even if such promises were kept indefinitely, we learn through history that only groups of nations have the possibility of sustaining a war. In the event of a possible future coalition. against Italy, Austria's heirs, even if without a fleet themselves, could certainly put their wonderful coast at the disposal of the fleet of their Allies, which would amount to the same thing as far as Italy is concerned.

Now, it was largely for the very object of solving definitely the wretched situation which from a strategical point of view she had on the Adriatic that Italy went to war against Austria. Even if the old enemy has disappeared, the geographical conditions which are the basis of this naval problem still remain unchanged.

It is owing to these geographical conditions that Italy in order to be safe within her own frontiers, must possess Dalmatia from Zara to Spalato, as well as the isles in front of the coast and adjoining it, i.e. the Lussinian and Curzolan islands. In fact, the possession of these islands would be worthless if heavy enemy artillery could make the anchorage and transit along them unsafe and even impossible.

It is therefore clear that Italy's claims, such as are shown in the London treaty have not arisen from imperialistic claims but simply from military necessity. It is not from the desire of conquering the territory of others, but simply owing to absolute need for our own future safety that we must ask today to be guided by what has proved a historical experience from the time of ancient Rome to the time of the Venetian Republic, and thence up to the present day. That is to say, we must ask to be given the key to the strategical and military situation in the Adriatic, i.e. Dalmatia with its isles, which have always belonged to every Adriatic power which has been in a position to rule its own destiny.

Even if, from a general point of view, Italy's claims had not, in respect of others, a more righteous case, it is indubitable that Italy has at least won the right to priority over Austria's heirs, who up to the last moment have staunchly supported the Hapsburg cause against the Entente.


Military Legal Arguments

Let us now consider the problem in the light of recent events, which intended to revive entirely the Austrian Fleet, i.e., the fleet of the defeated enemy under a new flag, thus snatching from us the main advantage of our victory, which consisted in the wiping out of the fleet of our old enemy in the Adriatic, where there is no room for two.

The Austrian fleet has been passed on [to] the Jugo-Slavs through a deed which has been signed on the one side by the legal representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Navy, but on the other side by absolutely unknown individuals who had no legal right to be recognized

as representing a State which, up to the present time, has not been established. In fact, if we are to consider the Jugo-Slavs as forming a new State, legally established on a legal basis, we must remark that a new State cannot definitely arise either from a defeat or from a victory, and still less from an armistice. It can only be established by the final decisions of a peace treaty, and by the final settlement which the Powers will agree to give to the world at large and especially to Europe.

It seems therefore quite obvious that as long as peace has not been concluded and the new map of Europe has not been definitely traced, there can be no doubt about the non-existence of a Jugo-Slav State, whose frontiers, territory, form of government, responsible Chief of Chiefs, laws, and all else that is essential to the existence of a State, are so far absolutely unknown.

Consequently, since a Fleet cannot but be a prominent feature of a State organization, there cannot be a fleet where there is no State. There cannot be a Jugo-Slav fleet as long as there is no Jugo-Slav State, that is to say, as long as peace is not signed.

The fleet which some call Jugo-Slav, is therefore both from a legal and naval standpoint [nothing] else but the defeated Austrian fleet which, in order to escape capture or surrender has arbitrarily and illegally changed its flag.

It is absolutely immaterial as far as the legal side is concerned whether the flag was changed before or after the armistice between Italy and Austria. If it was changed before it is still doubtless that it was Austria's fleet, (namely, the fleet of the State which was at war) which changed its flag. Now International Law forbids any belligerent to change its flag during war, and since the armistice had not been signed, we were undoubtedly still at war. No one can therefore admit as legally valid any change of flag which has taken place under such conditions. On the other hand, if the flag was changed after the armistice, it is plain Fraud since the conditions of the armistice provided explicitly that the enemy's fleet, i.e., the Austrian Fleet should be surrendered at Venice, which has absolutely not been done.

Truly both the Italian Navy and the Italian Nation deserved a better reward for their heroic bravery, and this reward, as far as the Navy is concerned, has been snatched from them through a mean and illegal intrigue. The case has been quite different in regard to the defeated German fleet. In hearing of the solemn and stern ceremony of the surrender of the German fleet to the British Navy one cannot but feel heartbroken that a similar reward was denied to our Navy, which surely had gained a full right to it through sacrifice and splendid valour.

Great honour is certainly due to our race which, in order to avoid conflicts and not to hamper the weary and complicated work of settling peace, has made it possible for the Italian Government not to insist on claiming this satisfaction, but in no case and for no reason must this be considered as a definite renunciation, when it simply means that Italy is patiently waiting for Justice.

In fact, having completely defeated her enemy, Italy has full right to claim that the Adriatic should be cleared of the enemy fleet. If this is not effected, all the sacrifice and bloodshed of the past years will have been in vain since, after such a long and terrible war, Italy would still be faced by the former unchanged conditions. It is really inconceivable that the fruits of victory as far as the Navy is concerned should be nullified simply by adding a blue stripe to a red and white flag. This is not enough to destroy more than three years' war effort of a Nation of 40 millions, since the changing of a flag does not alter the crews; and those very men who have been fighting us bitterly up to the last, may be our bitter opponents in the future. It is therefore necessary, to ensure in the future a safe peace, both to Italy and to Europe that the fleet of the vanquished enemy should be surrendered to the victor, or failing this, that it should be destroyed. Even if this second alternative should prevail at the Peace Conference, there is one point which has to be made clear and for which we have to stand. We have lost through mean fraud and enemy treachery two of our finest ships: Leonardo da Vinci and Benedetto Brin, blown up in harbour by Austria's criminal agents. Only for Justice sake those two ships must in any case be replaced. Consequently, even if the Peace Conference should not endorse the proposal that the defeated Austrian Fleet should be delivered to Italy, (a fair and proportionate part being allotted to the Allied Navies who have fought by our side), and decides that it should merely be destroyed, it will be necessary that at least two dreadnoughts should be given to us in exchange for the two which were treacherously blown up by the enemy.

Italy claims the Prinz Eugen and the Tegetoff.


Military Political Arguments

Besides, what can be the aim of this Jugo-Slav fleet which has so obstinately insisted and succeeded in remaining on the Eastern Adriatic coast, notwithstanding all clauses of the Armistice? Against whom can it be a weapon or a threat? Evidently not against France or against England, nor yet against the United States. There is therefore only one Nation left against whom under another flag and another name, the long inheritance of hatred sown by Austria on the Adriatic shores, shores which once belonged to Venice and which still bear the marks of its splendour, would be directed. This Nation is Italy.

Now Italy has fought this terrible war in order to break at last the long tradition of hatred. It is impossible that after having achieved victory she may agree to have in existence, under another flag, that very fleet which has been a constant menace to two generations of sailors and of patriots. Nor is it enough to take the fleet from Austria (i.e. the Jugo-Slavs); they must give up also Dalmatia and its isles and naval bases, without which this huge conflict would remain fruitless for us, leaving our future safety and prosperity in a precarious position and constantly threatened as they have been ever since Dalmatia ceased to be politically one with Italy.

Mere neutralisation or internationalisation of Dalmatia would also be worthless. Both these measures could only be fictitious and temporary remedies which would not solve the serious Adriatic problem and would only bear the germs of new and painful future conflicts. The question cannot be compromised. If we, who have gallantly and faithfully fought with our Allies for right and justice, are at fault, let us pay for it. But if we have brought our fair contribution to Victory, let us have the prize to which we have a full right, and let us break without quibbles and compromises, the chain which would, throughout the future, handicap our prosperity and our peaceful growth.


Economical Arguments

Free business intercourse and trade, as well as industrial and maritime expansion will be the essential factors of this growth.

Let us see what the conditions in regard to this provided for Italy by the Treaty of London, i.e. by the compromise which was made in 1915 between the Italian and the Russian Governments.

Whilst Italy obtained recognition of her rights only to one commercially and economically important port, the Slavs were granted possession of at least seven ports of economic importance, since they are the outlets of wide hinterlands. They were thus practically given all the commercial outlets on the East coast of the Adriatic except Trieste.

These ports are Fiume, Spalato, Metcovich, Cattaro, Ragusa, Antivari, Dulcigno. Trieste is not a port whose sphere of action does particularly extend to the Western Balkans.

The ports of Istria and those of Zara and Sebenico have, on account of geographic conditions, merely a local function. Zara and Sebenico cannot compete in any way with Spalato. On the contrary, from every one of the above mentioned seven ports important lines of penetration diverge and every one of them is the natural outlet to wide Balkan territories.

An absolute and substantial economic predominance has thus been ensured to the Slavs.


Conclusion

This memorandum, which has been prepared by the General Staff of the Navy, only deals with the Adriatic problem from a naval point of view and does not consider the military side of the question, nor any of the many other points which are all equally essential to Italy's growth.

Its object is to show that for historical, geographical, ethnical, moral and legal reasons, as well as on account of urgent naval necessity, our Nation cannot but claim at the Peace Conference the full and uncontested control of Dalmatia as an indispensable condition of the country's peaceful and prosperous development in all fields. The Treaty of London is a minimum below which it is impossible to fall, whilst it admits of higher claims proportionate to the function which Italy has had in the League of civilized nations which were associated in the strife against the Central Powers. This function has proved to be so much above any expectation of our Allies that it opens new horizons for our Nation which cannot escape notice by our statesmen, who would certainly not willingly renounce the duty of setting them forth and insisting on them at the right moment.

The Navy willingly repeats Attilio Tamaro's fine words:

“No imperialism nor any wish for military domination pushes us towards Dalmatia, but seek her in order to eliminate any possibility of future enemy threats to us, and to assert the predominance of our own civilisation which will make the Adriatic into a lake on which trade intercourse will grow peaceful, active and uninterrupted even should war ever break out elsewhere. Any man who is willing to attain this object ought to support an Adriatic programme in harmony with Italy's supreme interests, since any man who has a clear conception of geography, history and of the real conditions of the peoples who at present are aiming towards the Adriatic must be intimately and firmly convinced, that as long as the Adriatic problem has not been fully solved so as to exclude the possibility of any naval threat to Italy, our country will necessarily have a new Adriatic problem to solve whenever international difficulties arise in Europe.”

Dalmatia and Alsace-Lorraine: A Striking Parallel

(Taken from the journal “Modern Italy”, Volume 1, Issue 1, 1919.)

While the Peace Conference is assembling in Paris with the main object of ensuring a Peace of Justice for the sake of mankind, we submit to fair-minded people the following rather striking parallel between Alsace-Lorraine and Dalmatia.

The two questions are substantially alike, with an undeniable advantage on Italy's side.

From an historical point of view Alsace-Lorraine had been French for little over three centuries when she was forcibly detached from France in 1871. Dalmatia, even not considering the Roman period of her history, had been Venetian for eight centuries when she handed over to Austria by Napoleon in 1797. Alsace-Lorraine's deputies solemnly protested in 1871 against the annexation of that province to the German Empire. There were neither Dalmatian Parliament nor deputies in 1797; yet Italian-Dalmatians never ceased protesting energetically in all possible forms, from private individual action to official declarations made by Italian-Dalmatian deputies before the Parliament in Vienna.

From an ethnological point of view the French population in Alsace-Lorraine represents 2 percent of the total, according to most reliable statistics. The Italians in Dalmatia and in the archipelagos represent 12 percent of the whole, according to Austrian statistics which have been acknowledged as unreliable the world over, on account of their having been altered to Italy's disadvantage.

From a political point of view Alsace-Lorraine and Dalmatia are both typical examples of territories which have been forcibly detached from the States to which they had legitimately belonged for centuries. Therefore, as Alsace-Lorraine shall be definitely returned to France, Dalmatia should be returned to Italy, the legitimate heir of the Venetian Republic. This comparison, though schematic, is utterly eloquent, and we need nothing more to feel sure that fair-minded people will agree with our conclusions. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.

“Italy's war cannot be victorious unless it closes in the Trentino, on the Venetian Alps, at Trieste and at Fiume.” — Mazzini, in 1856.

“All great military authorities, up to Napoleon himself, have held that for Italy the only strong frontier is that line which Nature herself has traced along the summits of the mountains, dividing the waters that flow into the Black Sea from those that discharge themselves into the Adriatic basin.” — Mazzini, in 1866.

Redemption, Not Conquest

(Taken from the journal “Italy Today: A Fortnightly Bulletin”, Volume 2, Issue 2, 1919.)

Italian States in 1454
Istria and Dalmatia were linked to Italy

Certain organs of public opinion in this and other countries have on several occasions taken Italy to task for an alleged tendency to imperialism and for infringing upon the rights of the newly created Jugoslav nation. They allege that the Italians are animated by a spirit of conquest and that the Italian nation, before entering the war, wanted the other great powers of Europe to pledge themselves to give to her, in case of victory, certain lands that belonged to other nationalities. But the lands claimed by Italy are, in the eyes of every Italian, in the light of historical and geographical reasons, just as Italian as Lombardy and Venetia, redeemed from Austrian domination respectively in 1859 and 1866. The annexation of Istria, Trentino and part of Dalmatia is the completion of Italian unity, of that unity for which the Italians struggled for four long years, with perfect faith in the justice of their cause.

If — as it is advanced by Italy's adversaries and critics — there are many Slavs who inhabit the eastern coast of the Adriatic, it is no less true that the history of this coastal land is Italian in spite of the showing of census returns. It is no less true that the Italian element has always been predominant. It is no less true that the history of Dalmatia, its most notable monuments and its whole culture are products of either Roman or Venetian influence. It is no less true that the cities in particular still remain strongholds of Italian thought. It is no less true that in spite of numerical inferiority in some parts of the redeemed lands, the language, the customs, the civilization of those lands are purely Italian.

To redeem, not to conquer, those lands, the Italians have fought and bled and suffered. They are not annexing new land, they are joining to the common motherland parts that were detached from it.

This is not imperialism, it is not conquering — it is redemption.

Documents on Austrian and Slav Oppression of Italians

(Written by Felice Ferrero, taken from the journal “Italy Today: A Fortnightly Bulletin”, Volume 2, Issue 2, 1919.)

TRIESTE

Population Statistics of Trieste

The usual Austrian practice is to consider a person as belonging to the nationality of which he speaks the language. For Trieste, instead, the principle was adopted that the language of his parents should be considered. In spite of this, the results not being satisfactory to the authorities, a revision of the census was ordered and entrusted to a committee composed of Slavs and Germans, with no Italian representatives.

[...]

The Austrian Central Commission on Statistics in Vienna, with regard to the census of December 31, 1910 (Vol. II, No. 1) states the “Slav immigration during the last two years tends to diminish,” and “it would seem that at Trieste the numerical data on the language in use does not correspond to the facts.”

Police Oppression

(It is significant to note that the following are incidents typical of the treatment given by Austrian officials to Italians in times of peace.)

In 1910 six lectures by Italians on scientific subjects were forbidden by the government in Trieste within three months.

In November, 1910, all the Sunday lectures of the Extension University were forbidden. Among the forbidden lectures were one by D'Annunzio on Aviation and two by Orsi on Cavour and Bismarck. The Chief of Police of Trieste, in the case of Orsi, who was an Italian citizen, insisted that he should go to police headquarters and dictate his lectures to two policemen, so that the police officer in charge of the lecture room could control exactly his words. Orsi of course refused to give the lectures.

The [Austrian] police of Trieste forbade the playing of the Inno di Garibaldi and of the Marcia Reale.

In December, 1911, Antonio Visentini in Monfalcone received the order of destroying the winged lion of Venice which he had put on his house, as that “was to be considered as a political demonstration.“

The Bach police regulations, dated April 20, 1854, gave the police almost absolute power over the destinies and comfort of the citizens. The police can arrest any person for any act committed on the street or in public places which the police deem objectionable. The arrested person is taken to the police station, and by the high police officials can be sentenced without any formal proceedings, without right of defense, without even an explanation of the sentence, to light prison sentences which are sufficient to exclude that person from all public offices for the rest of his life. Moreover, the state attorney can. hold people in state of arrest for an indefinite time pending investigations. The most serious part of this is that the police of Trieste, as we saw, is almost totally made up of Slovene officers.

An Italian newspaper vendor was standing before a moving picture theatre in San Giacomo, one of the suburbs of Trieste, one Sunday, when two Slovenes passed him; they jeered at him, one struck him, saying, “You Italian swine,” the other planted a knife in his heart and killed him. When the two were arrested, they gave no excuse for their act, except this: he was an Italian. The murderer was sentenced to four months in prison.

Banks

Italian banks have not been allowed by the Austrian Government to open branches in Trieste. The main banks remain the German-Austrian banks, with which the Italians transact all business. These German banks are run quite impartially as purely business enterprises, and have almost entirely Italian staffs. The Slavic banks, however, are very powerful, much more so than would require the rather indifferent business activities of the Slovenes in Trieste.

Some strange facts are to be noticed in this Slavic bank world.

The most important of these banks is a branch of the Zivnostenska Banka of Prague, that is, Czecho-Slovak, which is the main backbone of all the Slavic activities-business and otherwise of Trieste.

Among the purely Slovene banks comes first the Jadranska Banka, with 8,000,000 kronen capital; the Lubianska Kreditna Banka, which has a slender budget of 28,000 kronen; the Trzaska Posojlnica in Hranilnica, which has a capital of 133,000 kronen and yet a movement of eleven million kronen of business. Besides this, there are two or three small banks with a capital of 8000 kronen which do business amounting many hundred thousands a year. There is no real business to keep these banks going and the Czecho-Slovak bank is called upon very often to save them from trouble with the money, which the Slovak bank draws from unknown sources.

The chief activities of these banks seem to be to buy Italian property and Italian business wherever they can get it and at any price, provided their position is such that it affords an opening for the Slav invasion.

Some curious examples of the business transactions of these banks are the following:

Grignano is a small town not very far from Trieste. The Trzaska Posojlnica in Hranilnica has bought large holdings of land on the shore of this town, built hotels and bath establishments and created from nothing a summer resort for Slavs, excluding from it all Italian traders and all Italian signs. The town had a small dock on the shore at which the small steamers of an Italian company from Trieste used to tie up. Now the bank has excluded from the use of the public dock, in a town in which many Italians pay taxes, the steamers of this company, reserving its use for the steamers of a Slovene company. An Italian peasant nearby, having had a barge full of bricks. sent to him, was not allowed to use the dock for unloading, and had to build a temporary dock and piles for himself. The Austrian Government, which has control of all the seashore rights, never made a move.

The Jadarska Banka financed lavishly a large Italian lumber firm; then with the threat of foreclosure of the mortgage imposed its own Slovene manager, then Slovene employees, and finally Slovene workmen. Similarly the bank has succeeded in getting control of an Italian brewery; and in the case of a merchant, a certain Gustavo Marco, lent him 240,000 kronen for a glass factory, gradually imposed on him managers and workmen Slovenes, Slavs, Croatians and finally reduced the owner to the rank of a nominal superintendent with a salary of fifty kronen a week to begin with, reduced later to thirty kronen.

A bank of Gorizia, the Trgovsko-obrtna Zadruga, with 5000 kronen capital, has 21/2 millions of deposits, and invests the whole of its holdings in the building of a national house in Gorizia and in the purchase of a hotel of the Süd-Bahn—the first an enterprise with no returns, and the second an enterprise with no profits. The Government, which has the supervision of the banks, did not interfere.

In Zara a small Croatian bank was discovered, during a suit for bankruptcy, to have lent money without any mortgage instruments, had a board of directors who were paid ten kronen for every session, and never had any sign of activities. A government inspector made a report, but the government ignored it until the crash came.

Yet most of these banks manage to go through almost all crises, thanks to help from the Czecho-Slovak bank or other secret sources, which are known to have been Russian to the point that in Trieste the Russian ruble was circulated almost as freely as the Austrian kronen.

Slav Invasion

The center of Slavic agitation in Trieste is the Narodni Dom, a huge building right in the middle of Trieste, which directs all the campaigns of attack against the Italian population. The expenses for the building were borne by the Slovene Bank of Deposits and Loans and Loans (Trzaska Posojlnica in Hranilnica). The house, however, always shows a deficit, which is paid from secret sources. Connected with the house there is a Hotel Balkan. The Austrian Government, in a circular to the army, has advised the officers passing through Trieste to use the Hotel Balkan, “to increase its revenue and spite the Triestans.”

The central organization of the Slovenes is the Edinost Union, which is a political association and has its seat in the Narodni Dom. It spreads all through the districts of the mixed population of the Friuli.

One of the chief purposes of the Edinost seems to be the directing to Trieste of the largest possible emigration of Slovene workmen, which it it does by means of an employment office that supplies strike breakers when necessary or useful.

The Edinost has also founded two primary schools in Trieste with 1722 pupils in 1912, and a trade school with 79 students in 1913. One of the two primary schools cost 500,000 kronen, the origin of which is unknown.

It is at the suggestion of the then president of the Edinost, Dr. Rybar, a Slovene, that the Governor of Trieste, Prince Hohenlohe, published four decrees in 1910 excluding from the employment of the municipality of Trieste all the Italians of Italy.

The Edinost

The Edinost, which is also the newspaper of the organization, has been so violent in attacking the Italians that it has had even to be seized and suppressed by the Austrian authorities.

Here is the program for national propaganda as it appears in the columns of that paper in the number of January 7, 1911:

“Tomorrow the Slavs of Trieste must speak. We are here and we will stay here and enjoy our rights. Tomorrow we shall throw the gauntlet of defiance to the coterie which dominates, and then will begin the duel which we shall not give up until the day when we have under our feet, crushed to dust, the artificial Italianism of Trieste. So far our struggle was for equality. Tomorrow we shall say to the Italians that the future struggle will be for domination. We shall not stop until WE command in Trieste; we Slovenes, Slavs! The Italianism of Trieste, which is now ebbing, is now celebrating its last orgy before its death. Tomorrow we, the Slovenes of Trieste, shall invite these voted to death to recite the confiteor.”

Employees

1. Unionbaugesellschaft — employs all Italians.

2. 1900-10. Population of Carniola increases 3.3 per cent., Slavs in Trieste 130 per cent.

3. Railroad of Tauri imports 700 Slovene families of railroad workers.

4. New harbor of Sant'Andrea. 2500 laborers, all Slovene.

5. New harbor of Sant'Andrea. Beginning work of discharging ships, 64 Slovene stevedores against 160 Triestine applications.

6. Austrian Lloyd. 1300 Slovenes out of 3000 shipyard workmen.

7. Triestine Technical Works: By order of the Government all Italians and many Triestans are discharged, their places being filled with Slovenes, Croatians and Germans.

Bureaucracy (1910)

4000 positions for subordinate government employees and 3700 given to Slovenes.

Government railroads of 828 station employees: 728 are Slavs, 70 Italian, 30 Germans.

Post Office: 358 clerks — 245 Slavs and 95 Italians.

Customs-house Officers: 500 — 146 Italians.

Police: 661 — 100 Italians.

Südbahn (private): 1913

Station: Employees 369 — 260 Slavs, 70 Italians, 30 Germans.

Laborers: 380 — 354 Slavs, 6 Italians, 20 Germans.

Journeymen: 300 — 298 Slavs, 2 Italians.

Inspectors: 50 — 47 Slavs, 3 Italians.

Railroad restaurants: Slovene signs and Slovene waiters.

A Triestan [who speaks] Italian, Slovene [and] German was refused for mail carrier; accepted Slovenes speaking only their own language.

Schools

Trieste had an Italian gymnasium dating from 1619; amplified by Napoleon; in 1815 was suppressed; petitions for the reopening of the gymnasium were presented to the government in 1824, 1833, 1840, 1851, 1859, 1861, 1862. In 1862 the government gave permission, provided the city would pay expenses. The city immediately decided to do so, but permission was suspended. Finally, 1863, the gymnasium was opened, but its examinations are not considered valid for state purposes.

There are no Italian high schools in Pirano; Rovigno with 5000 Italian inhabitants; Monfalcone with 12,000 Italians.

In Gorizia there were allowed Italian classes in the German gymnasium under the principalship of a Slovene, with the limitation of the number of pupils to 50.

Italian primary schools in Trieste, all supported by the city, were founded in 1868, with 6819 pupils. In 1911 there were 21 schools with 16,470 pupils. Illiteracy has dropped from 43 to 14 per cent.

Heroic Episodes in Fight for Schools

At San Colombano, in Istria, 89 family heads were tried and sentenced to jail for insisting that they wanted an Italian school instead of a Slovene school.

At Servola, a suburb of Trieste, in 1911 there used to come every morning a child of six years, Celestina Rosa, accompanied by three brothers, coming from Bagnoli, another village, having to walk every day four hours to come and go.

In Trieste the government has forbidden the teaching of the history of Trieste itself.

An order of the last Governor of Trieste, Prince Hohenlohe, dated June 24, 1913, forbids the town council of Trieste to give the names of Dante and Petrarca to two schools of which the city pays the entire expenses.

The Church

The Church is one of the most potent vehicles of the national agitation among the Slavs, and this is equally true of the Catholic Church as of the Orthodox.

At present the diocese of Trieste has 290 priests, of which 190 are Slovenes. The Church has even tried to introduce Slav influence into the convents and monasteries. The priests at Daila, in Istria, who were all The Italians, are all Slav now. monastery of the Minor Observant, in Capodistria, is already partly filled with Croatian monks. Croatian nuns from Agram [Zagreb] have opened a school in Pola. The Slovene nuns of Cilli tried to open a school in Trieste, but they got badly tangled up in financial matters and the Government saved them from bankruptcy by buying their building for 900,000 kronen.

On the other hand, the Italian friars of Pirano who had asked to open at their own expense a branch of their monastery in Pola, were refused the permission.

In 1909 there was a Eucharistic Congress at Ragusa, in Dalmatia. 600 Croatian priests from Agram [Zagreb] went to Fiume to board a steamer for Ragusa and traversed the city marching on a front of four, like soldiers, with Croatian flags and singing war songs. As the steamer passed Zara, they renewed their demonstrations, shouting insults to the Italians of that city. Great tumult followed, with blows and pistol shots. The Slavs who were arrested were at once released, while the Italians who were arrested had to stay for several days in jail. And this was all for a religious ceremony.

In Spalato, a man known to be of Italian sentiment died; the Croatian priest refused to assist him in his last moments, refused to open the church for the funeral, refused to allow him to be buried in a cemetery.

In Istria, at Topolovatz, the priest, a man called Knavs, refused to bury an Italian girl, who was left for two days and two nights in her home.

In Sterna the priest Nedeved refused the last rites to a carpenter of Uberton because he was Italian.

At Lindaro, near Pisino, a Croatian priest refused to baptize a child because the father requested that the formula be said in Latin instead of Slovene.

On October 28, 1913, the master of the Italian school of Sovignaco, in Istria, was tried before the court of Rovigno for “disturbing the functions of the Catholic religion for having, during the procession of St. Mark, made the Italian school children sing the litanies in Latin, while the priest Klun and the other believers were singing in Croatian.”

In the diocese of Trieste the Italian priest of Roviano was suspended a divinis by the bishop for having refused to sing tantum ergo in Slav, while the Vatican orders it sung in Latin.

Courts

From 1781 to 1895 proceedings were held in the language of the country, hence in Italian. Later Slovene wa s introduced.

In 1903, all hearings were held in Slovene, and, despite vigorous protests, there was no response from the Government and Slovene was imposed.

Elections

A Jugo-Slav writer in a newspaper recently complained that in Trieste during the last elections, 14,000 Italian votes could elect four members to the Reichsrat, while 10,000 Slovene votes elected only one, giving this as an example of the favoritism of the Austrian Government toward the Italians. The writer, to begin with, forgot 9000 Socialist votes which are entirely Italian, because the Slav Socialists vote for their own people, and secondly forgot that in the present arrangement of majority representation, this fact is simply proof of the minority of the Slavs and nothing else.

In Connecticut, for instance, there are five members of Congress, four of whom are Republican and one is Democratic, and yet the Democratic party polled some 75,000 votes against 86,000 of the Republican. But the Slavs would like to have majority representation where they are in the majority, and proportional representation where they are in the minority.

Register of Land Surveys

The register is compiled with notes in Slovene, German and Croatian. The Diet proposed one in Italian with authentic Slovene translation but the Government refused.

Zara: Italian register of land surveys (1914) was translated into Croatian and the names were changed.

FIUME

(From Current History, January, 1918)

Fiume was just outside the terrain of evacuation; still, it has a predominating Italian population of 45,000. The Mayor was Italian, so was the Town Council. Armed bands of Jugo-Slavs under orders from the Jugo-Slav Council at Agram entered the town, forced the resignation of the Mayor and Town Council, and ordered them to take down the Italian flag and hoist the Jugo-Slav banner in its place. Gatherings of Italians to celebrate the Italian victory were dispersed by rifle and machinegun fire. Italian soldiers on the heights above the city looked on and saw their fellow countrymen thus terrorized and were powerless to help them until orders came from General Diaz for their take possession of Fiume and protect the Italians there. Meanwhile similar, although not so serious, Jugo-Slav demonstrations commander, General Raineri, to had taken possession of Fiume and Pola, where they had been suppressed by the respective military Governors, General Petitti and Admiral Cagni.

[...]

DALMATIA

November 1910: Court clerk called before disciplinary commission of the Court of Appeals of Cittavecchia to answer to the charges of:

1. Leader (instructor) of an Italian music band.

2. Had his daughter baptized in Italian.

3. Had his daughter baptized in Mafalda.

1914: Italian register of the survey of lands (libro catasto) translated into Croatian and names altered.

The Oesterreichische Rundschau in Vienna, May 1, 1909, wrote:

“We must act at Trieste as we did in Dalmatia; help the non-Italian propaganda in order decidedly to suppress the Italian element.”

See also:
Italy's Case Against the Jugo-Slavs

Italy's Case Against the Jugo-Slavs

(Written by Felice Ferrero, taken from the journal “Italy Today: A Fortnightly Bulletin”, Volume 2, Issue 2, 1919.)

An Address made by Dr. Felice Ferrero in answer to Mr. V. R. Savic at a Luncheon organized by the League for Free Nations.

In order clearly to understand the Italian position in the so-called Adriatic question, we must state first what is the real political status at present of the Jugo-Slavs. This point has been brought out already several times in the press, but it is necessary to insist upon it because it has a good deal of bearing upon the whole question. As you doubtless know, the Jugo-Slav state does not exist; neither the United States, nor Great Britain, nor France, nor Italy, have recognized the Jugo-Slav state, although they have all expressed their sympathy with the Jugo-Slav aspirations. The Jugo-Slavs accuse Italy of being the real obstacle to such recognition and it is quite possible that such is the fact, but we shall see that there are many very good reasons for it.

As things now stand, we have the old kingdom of Serbia, which is one of the Allies and will be represented at the peace conference. On the other hand we have a group of populations composed of Slovenes, Croats, Bosnians, Herzegovinians and Dalmatians who are part of an enemy country; who to the effects of international law are still an enemy population, and who are waiting for the peace congress to decide what shall be done with them. In this decision they, as well as the other parts of the Austro-German Empire dr, Germany, have no voice at all. It is for us, the Allied countries, and more precisely for the four Great Powers, to say what their fate shall be. There is no doubt that the verdict of the congress of peace will be that those people, in so far as they make up a compact national unit, shall join their Serbian kinsmen to form a greater state therein to enjoy a full national life, if their internal quarrels will allow. When, however, it comes to territories, where such people do not form a compact national unit, but are mixed with Italian populations, that is to say, to the Adriatic provinces, the question as to what should be done with such regions is already settled by the all too famous and much abused Treaty of London.

Validity of Treaty of London

Before I go any further into the discussion of the Treaty of London, I should like to indulge in a few general considerations concerning the reception that the treaty has been given in the world at large. The Jugo-Slav agitators in this country and in Europe would like to give the impression that the treaty is null and void because it was a secret treaty, and this being the dawn of the wonderful era of democracy and people's brotherhood, secret treaties are not allowed. I should like to call your attention to the fact that, so far, such view has been expressed officially only by the Premier of Serbia and the Premier of Greece, two countries in which, as is unfortunately the case of most Balkanic countries, political good faith is usually held in very low esteem. As a matter of fact the treaty still exists and none of the signing powers have expressed any intention of not honoring it. The Minister of Foreign Affairs in Great Britain, Mr. Balfour, has solemnly declared in Parliament that any treaty bearing the signature of the British Government is sacred to Great Britain; and no opposition has arisen on the part of the French Government, although the Jugo-Slavs, by the very reprehensible game of stirring up ill feelings between allies in favor of an enemy, have succeeded in creating a certain current in their favor in part of the press of all countries.

As for the United States, it is futile to say that the fact that it was not a party to the compact makes it free to help the cause of the enemy Croatians against allied Italy. If my information is correct the United States was informed of the existence of the treaty when it entered the war and raised no objection to it; then actually implicitly accepted it by sending troops to the Italian front. The number of American troops at the Italian front was, it is true, quite small; but again, if I am correctly informed, the American Government had decided to send, and Secretary Baker had ordered, very large contingents to the Italian front, when the order was suspended and withdrawn because of certain opposition which for the moment I need not discuss further, as this is not quite pertinent to the subject in hand.

It is rather unpleasant to have to remind people of a debt of honor, because such things are supposed to be unnecessary among gentlemen. If anyone will say that, circumstances having changed, the signatures of France and England are no longer good, I shall not argue the question with him. I shall remind him that the war which devastated Europe was possible only because of an act of international bad faith on the part of Germany, which alone brought the intervention of England in the war; and also that the cause of the entrance of the United States in the war was not, as people often say, the championship of any principles of democracy but again an act of international bad faith on the part of Germany in not keeping her submarine agreement. International laws and relations are based on good faith, as there is no other possible force to enact international agreements; and it would be a sad league of nations, indeed, or a poor peace, indeed, that would begin with such an act of bad faith as the violation of a treaty.

The Slav's Threat of War

The Serbian and Jugo-Slav agitators would like to have us believe that a settlement of the Adriatic question according to the Treaty of London would mean certain war in the future; in fact, they threaten us with war to the knife if we dare to think of it. I am quite sure that the Jugo-Slavs and their friends need not worry about possibilities of war. This peace, like every other peace, will have the germs of the next war in it, no matter what we do. Without going any further, Alsace-Lorraine will be sufficient excuse for a powerful Germany of the future to start trouble whenever she feels strong enough for it, not only because of national claims, but because of the very important fact that the transfer of Lorraine to France will have given to France the best iron deposits of Germany and 80 percent of the total iron production of Europe. And the rivalries of the small states which are rising all through Eastern and Central Europe, making of it an immense Balkanic peninsula, will be enough to give food for thought and occupation for armies for centuries to come, unless some way can be found of keeping them down.

The threat of war on the part of Premier Vestnich, of Serbia, strikes me as either funny or pitiful, according to the point of view. We know very well that Serbia has a little army left — the army which Italy saved for her after the tragic retreat of Albania by transferring it to Corfu and then to Salonica — but it might be well to remind the Premier that all the manhood of military age of Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia and of Slovenia is held prisoner in Italy, and that Italy has been supplied by the collapse of the Austrian army, which was made up of one-third of Croatians, with enough guns, ammunitions, horses, motor trucks, airplanes, gasolene and ships to keep in order for a long time to come not only little Serbia, but greater Serbia, or a fellow many times her size. But the threat seems to me too absurd to consider it further, even as a jest.

Conciliatory Faction in Italy

The Treaty of London, then, stands as it is. The intemperance, however, of the Jugo-Slavs in putting forth their claims has stirred up a counter current of nationalism in Italy which goes much beyond the limits of the Treaty of London and claims, besides Fiume, the whole of Dalmatia, and, beyond, Ragusa and Cattaro. I should not be surprised if these claims were recognized by the peace congress, and if so, the Jugo-Slavs will have only to thank their own work for it.

The Jugo-Slavs and their friends tried to make much of the fact of supposed dissension in the Italian public concerning the Treaty of London. The party of conciliation with the Jugo-Slavs, which the Jugo-Slavs have very wrongly interpreted as a party of renunciation, is headed by the Corriere della Sera of Milan. Inasmuch as I have belonged to the editorial staff of the Corriere since my college graduation and I am still connected with it, I may claim the privilege of giving you some exact information as to what the polemics started by the Corriere last fall exactly mean in this matter. The Corriere and its followers never meant to abandon the claims of Italy to Trieste, Gorizia, Gradisca and Istria; lately the Corriere has added Fiume to the claims of Italy, about which no discussion is even admitted. The Corriere said, however, that in view of the evident advantages of conciliation and friendly relations with the neighboring Slav state-to-be, it might be advisable to compromise on the question of Dalmatia by allowing the Croatians to control Dalmatia on condition, however, that the necessary guarantees be given for the protection of the Italian element living there. That was all.

And this is also the standpoint that I have supported in this country, strenuously enough to bring upon my head, on the part of the Italian press, the accusation of being a pro-Slav; but I must sincerely confess that given the tone of the Jugo-Slav agitation, I very much fear that no matter what the Italians might be willing to concede for the sake of conciliation, no conciliation is possible, and I doubt very much besides whether the arrangement suggested by this conciliatory party would be of any greater satisfaction to the Croatians than the intransigent behavior of Minister Sonnino. This party of conciliation, in fact, would require, as I said, absolute guarantees for the Italian element in Dalmatia, failing which they would approve of armed intervention to secure them.

Since the Croatians of Dalmatia, short of a miracle, are not to be depended upon to respect other nationalities, as I shall show you later on the basis of documents, this would mean a clash between Italy and the future Jugo-Slav state within a very few years, and with such prospect in view I think it would be a safer proceeding to settle the matter now along the clearer, if apparently stiffer, lines of the Sonnino program. 

Pact of Rome

There has been a tendency on the part of the Jugo-Slavs toward accusing Italy of, let us say, forgetfulness, because of that Pact of Rome of last winter which was supposed to have established an agreement between Italy and Slavs. I shall say, however, that that Pact of Rome expressly excluded any question of territorial boundaries and simply formulated a program of action by which the oppressed nationalities of Austria should co-operate in the destruction of the Austrian Empire. This was accomplished, but it is regrettable to say that while all the other oppressed nationalities did their part, the Croatians, Bosnians, Herzegovinians, Slovenes and Dalmatians did not; they fought with the Austrian Empire and for the Austrian Empire until the last, running out of the house and seeking shelter in the bosom of the Allies only when they heard the timbers of the roof crash over their heads. Under the circumstances, little consideration is due to them for the results.

And now let us examine very briefly the arrangements of the Treaty of London, as far as they apply to the Adriatic. There are two separate parts of the Adriatic provinces which the Treaty of London gives to Italy; one is the northern part including Gorizia, Gradisca, Carinthia, part of Carniola, Trieste and Istria — to these now Fiume has added itself by its own plebiscite. The other is Dalmatia.

As far as the first part is concerned, I beg to state that no differences of opinion exist in the mind of any Italian; that part is occupied, will be retained, and no discussion is at all admitted by any Italian party of any kind. Only as a matter of extreme courtesy, I will allow myself to take up a few arguments which may be of interest in this question.

Population of Disputed Area

The reason why Italy insists on the possession of these regions is twofold. First, because the country is inhabited by a large Italian population, amounting to about one-half of the total, which has been long persecuted and oppressed by Austria, especially through the medium of the Slovene population. It might be of interest to you to know that irredentism in Trieste is a matter of comparatively recent times. ... With the advance of Italy toward the East and the freeing from Austrian dominion of Lombardy and Venice, Austria entirely reversed its policy and began a most determined attempt to stifle the Italian character of Trieste and neighboring countries by helping and encouraging the national invasion of the Slovene population. A state of political tension followed which I shall describe later, and resulted in a Slovene oppression of the Italian city and the development of a powerful feeling of irredentism in its Italian population.

The case of Fiume is even more conspicuous, as Fiume has always been a free city strongly animated by feelings of local freedom. The irredentism of Fiume which led to its declaration of union with Italy practically dates from the declaration of the war and the regime of violence which under the protection of the Austrian Government was instituted in the city by the Croatian element. Such feeling is now so strong that the Mayor of Fiume solemnly declared in Rome that should Fiume be assigned by the peace conference to Croatia, the entire population of Fiume would rather migrate than stay, and other officials of the city, not constrained by the necessity of keeping parliamentary language, put it more bluntly by saying that the Fiumans would rather go to hell than be with Croatia.

A curious thing is to be noted here. I said that the population of those regions is about half Italian and half Slav. According to the Slavic figures it is exactly 439,413 Slavs and 354,595 Italians. It must be remarked, however, that these figures are based on a revised census of 1910 for the city of Trieste — an interesting instance, this, which I shall explain to you later — the first census taken that year giving Trieste 24,000 more Italians and therefore 24,000 fewer Slavs — that is with a shift of 48,000 in the proportions of the two parts of the population. This shift would bring the total Slav population down to 415,000, and the total Italian up to 378,000. If we add to these 35,000 Italians and the 10,000 Slavs of Fiume, we should reach the final figures of 413,000 Italians against 425,000 Slavs, which figure, however, includes a few thousand Germans and Hungarians of Trieste, Fiume and Pola. In other words, the population is about equally divided.

The curious thing is that the Jugo-Slavs and their friends, while they accuse Italy of imperialism for its intention to incorporate 425,000 Slavs in this region, apparently think nothing of the fact that the Jugo-Slavs would like to include 413,000 Italians in their own territory.

The facts on which the whole question of the population hinges, Italians and Jugo-Slavs substantially agree upon. The Jugo-Slavs admit that the majority of the cities is Italian, and the Italians agree that the majority of the country[side] population is Slav; in what exact proportions it really does not matter. We also agree that it is practically impossible to separate the cities and the hinterland. The question then is: shall the cities go with the country, or the country with the cities? In the world of hypothesis the Italian claim that the country must go with the cities is as good as the Slav claim that the cities must go with the country.

Frontier Question

But the Italians have some other and better reasons in their favor, chief of which is the protection of their frontiers. By extending the boundaries to the main divide of the Alps in Southern Tyrol and in the East, Italy has secured for herself absolute protection against any possibility of foreign invasion. The war has proved that no army, no matter how powerful, can cross a well defended mountain chain. The Russians failed in the Carpathians, the French and Germans failed respectively in the Vosges, the Austrians failed on the Trentino side of Italy and the Italians failed on the eastern side. The only chance for the invasion that devastated part of Italy for a year was exactly through the open door of the East. You may rest assured that Italy, having now conquered by force of arms, the eastern door to her house, will not relinquish it.

[...]

Suppression of Italians in Dalmatia

As to Dalmatia, the story is a little bit different, but only apparently so. It is true that the overwhelming majority of the population is Croatian, with the exception of the city of Zara, which is Italian-note the curious fact that the capital of a Slavic province has remained Italian in spite of all things done to change it but it will not be amiss to remember that Dalmatia was for three centuries part of the Republic of Venice, that from 1815 to 1866, during the first part of the Austrian occupation, Dalmatia was still connected with the provinces of Lombardy and Venice, that Italian was the official language of the courts, of all public offices and of the schools. Until about 1870 Italians and Slavs in Dalmatia lived in very good harmony, the Slavs accepting the influence of Italian civilization, going to Padua and not to Agram [Zagreb] for their college studies, and generally recognizing the historical necessity of the Italian character of Dalmatia.

It might interest you to know that Nicolò Tommaseo, a Dalmatian who wrote (in Italian) a lyric to the Greater Serbia which would come in the future, and who became one of the greatest grammarians of Italy, wrote in 1837 the following lines to Cesare Cantù: “I am Italian because I was born of Venetian subjects, because my first language was Italian, because my great-grandmother's father came to Dalmatia from the valleys of Bergamo. Dalmatia virtually is more Italian than Bergamo, and I at heart am more Italian than Italy.” And let me also quote from a Croatian newspaper of Spalato, the Nase Jedinsto of December, 1910: “We no longer study Italian and great is the danger that comes from this, especially among the young people.”

Affairs changed in Dalmatia, at the same time as in the north and for the same reason, in about 1870, and in the new generations of Croatians, helped and egged on by the Austrian Government, grew the fierce, almost savage, spirit of aggressive nationalism that had only one program: destroy everything, and with all means, that was not Croatian. With the help of the Government they suppressed Italian as the official language in offices, they suppressed the Italian schools, they suppressed the Italian courts, they even forced Italians that have to do with courts to stand proceedings in Croatian without any interpreter, and to have all documents concerning property, like mortgages, transfers, etc., written and registered in Croatian. It is a very easy argument, of course, on the part of the Croatians to say that we must deal with conditions as they are now and not as they were. That is the comfortable argument by which Germany tried to persuade the world that the occupation of Belgium was no longer to be discussed; but it is not unnatural that many in Italy should want not only to recall a past which dates back only about forty years—about the time of the Alsace-Lorraine occupation-h also investigate the methods with which some of the results of the present day have been achieved. I do not see, therefore, that the matter of the present make-up of the population of Dalmatia should be any obstacle to the Italian occupation.

Italy, on the other hand, has some important reasons, also of a military nature, for the occupation of those lands, and especially of Sebenico, which is the best harbor of the Adriatic after Cattaro. Slavs accuse Italy of wanting to make of the Adriatic an Italian lake. That, however, is not the idea of Italy. What Italy wants to do is to make the Adriatic a sea in which there is no foreign navy to threaten her coasts, nor any possibility of such a foreign navy being developed; with the occupation of the harbors of Pola, Sebenico, possibly Cattaro, and the control of the entrance to the Adriatic through the occupation of Valona, such result is very definitely and positively obtained. “But whoever threatens Italy?” say our Croatian neighbors, who alternately play the role of the lamb and the lion according to the effect desired. The Croatians with their Serbian friends have struck such a belligerent tone that any measure of protection on the part of Italy would be, by this very fact, justified in the eyes of all peoples.

The Russian Peril

That is not all. We come here to a very interesting argument, which has to do with the present situation of of Central and Eastern Europe and the possibilities of their future. For one thing I read in the book of my esteemed opponent, Vladislav R. Savic, the following passage: “It is of no small concern to Italy and the world which road the future Russian policy will take; will she develop like a sincere, broad-minded, peaceful and tolerant democracy, or be eaten by the cancerous desire of world domination? ... In vain Italians would say tomorrow that imperial Russia had consented to their occupation of those Slav lands ... Unable to hinder the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, Prince Gorchakov, at the Congress of Berlin is reported to have said to Count Andrassy: 'Well, go in, but Bosnia and Herzegovina will prove to be the tomb of Austria-Hungary. Are the words of Prince Gorchakov to Count Andrassy no warning to Italy?'”

Here we see our Jugo-Slav neighbors threatening us the resurrection and the vengeance of Russia. But, gentlemen, the possibility of Russia's reaching the Adriatic shore through the lands of the Southern Slavs, acting either as her allies or as her vassals, was exactly one of the reasons that prompted the claims of Italy at the time of the Treaty of London, a reason which the contracting parties then and most writers now acknowledged to be very good. The danger is then still impending, it seems. Why should the Italian policy change, then, if such is the condition?

But there is something more that I should like to call to your attention.

Revival of Austrian Empire

The Jugo-Slavs will be a small power and to Italy, at least, an inoffensive state, it is said. Granted. But there is something behind and beyond the Jugo-Slav state that must be considered. I have recently, in a statement to the press, accused the Croatians of making Austrian propaganda by their trying to stir up trouble and ill feeling among the Allies. This, gentlemen, is not idle talk, is not chasing of spooks. The revival of the Austrian Empire in the original form, only enlarged, is far from being a remote contingency. We heard a few days ago President Masaryk of Czecho-Slovakia openly declare that one of the purposes of the foreign policy of Czecho-Slovakia would be the formation of a Danube Confederation, to which the Germans of Austria will be also admitted, if they so desire, the center and directing power of such federation to be in Prague. Gentlemen, this is nothing more and nothing less than Austria as it was, with the addition of Serbia; the only difference being the ingenuous belief of President Masaryk that if the Germans of Austria are admitted to the confederation, the Slavs of Czecho-Slovakia could even for one moment retain the controlling position in the confederation as against the active organizing and executive powers of the Germans of Vienna.

[...]

To come now to a conclusion, the situation is really a very simple one. It is not possible to dispose of the Adriatic coast without putting Slavs under Italian control or Italians under Slav control; it is only a matter of who should get first consideration. That Italy has the right to this first consideration is something that very few people will doubt in view of the facts and of the considerations already stated. I have been myself a partisan of the conciliatory policy suggested by the Corriere della Sera, as I stated before, and in this sense I have spoken at Columbia, at City College of New York, in cities outside of New York, and have written on many occasions; but I fear me that in view of the attitude assumed by our Croatian enemies, and I regret to add by our Serbian friends, a conciliation will be It difficult to reach. very seems to me that the cry which the Jugo-Slavs are trying to pass for the exultant voice of a new-born nation is nothing more than the ugly growl of a dog who sees a fat chunk of meat taken away from him and knows besides that the big stick of his master is no longer there to defend him in the enjoyment of his improperly acquired meat. I still hope against hope, but I must say the Adriatic question is a question that concerns Italy and the Jugo-Slavs — nobody else — and the next move for a good understanding must come from the Jugo-Slav side and in the proper frame of mind, that is of modesty and repentance; as far as I know Italy has done everything that she could do.

See also:

Documents on Austrian and Slav Oppression of Italians