The following document was presented at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and is conserved in “Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume I”, published in 1942 by the U.S. Department of State (DOS).
Preface
The many arguments which have been put forward in favor of Italy's right to extend its sovereignty over some strips of the eastern coast of the Adriatic are, by now, generally known. These arguments were an inducement for Italy to enter into the huge fight, which has raged over Europe for four years, and if, at the time they were the very objects of the war, their fulfillment ought to be today the reward for the tremendous sufferings which the country has undergone.
These arguments may be roughly divided in two classes: some of them appeal to sentiment, others are based upon facts. This distinction makes it clear that whilst some of our claims (those based on sentiment) although quite legitimate and fair could not, by themselves be strong enough as a deciding argument at the peace conference; others (those based on facts) represent such indispensable needs that failure to get these recognized would deprive Italy of the fruits of her great victory, would cripple her prospects, and definitely prejudice the possibility of a quiet and prosperous future, such as the new destinies indicated by this war offer to our race. This is why Italy cannot but insist on them.
Part I: Sentimental Reasons
Historical Reasons
Danielli in his book “Dalmatia” has thus epitomized the Italian character of Dalmatia at the end of his chapter on Dalmatian history:
“Already in the third century before Christ, did the Romans, then at war with the Carthaginians, understand how necessary it was to them to rule the Adriatic, and that in order to do so they needed to dominate its Eastern Coast. It was thus that after the end of the first Punic War they started in 229 B. C. the first of these ten Illyrian wars which in the year 78 B.C. brought the entire region East of the Adriatic under their rule.
The whole of Dalmatia belonged to Rome for nearly six centuries without interruption: it went then to the Italian Kingdom of Odoacre and to the Italian Kingdom of the Ostrogoths: and finally to the Empire of the East when Italy was reconquered. Venice had possession of the whole of it from the end of the XV century to the end of the XVIII century except for such temporary and partial losses which occurred in her struggles with the Turcs. Venice never gave up the islands and the towns on the Dalmatian coast not even during those short periods during which Dalmatia was partially Croat or Hungarian.
Only at the end of the XVIII century Dalmatia came under the rule of the Austrian Monarchy and only in as much as it was made an heir to the territory of the Venetian Republic. Dalmatia remained therefore even then all one with Italy. It was included in Napoleon's ephemeral Kingdom of Italy, from which it was only temporarily severed to form the provinces of Illyria. It then was restored unto Austria together with Venice and it is only from 1866 until today that it has existed politically severed from the Italian peninsula.
Therefore not only by nature art and civilisation, but also through its history, Dalmatia essentially pertains to Italy.”
Geographical Reasons
To summarize all the conditions orographical, hydrographical, geological, climatic, etc., which determine the geographical characteristics of Dalmatia would be beyond the scope of a short article. Such a study would involve a lengthy reference to numerous books dealing with the various aspects of this question and its consequences would be to show that even the Austrian and German geographical experts admit that indisputably Dalmatia belongs to Italy.
In this connection, a reference to Danielli's great book is of interest. On page 8 he thus expresses himself:
“Now Dalmatia both as regards its mainland and neighbouring isles consists of a low lying territory at the foot of the slopes descending from a high plateau. Thus its clearly defined characteristics which differentiate it from those of the interior of the continent have impelled all authorities, ancient and modern, Italian or alien, to affirm that Dalmatia is geographically a unit completely divorced from the remainder of the Balkan peninsula in spite of territorial continuity.”
Ethnical Reasons
Venetian Domination ended by the inclusion of these provinces in the “Serenissima” (i.e. Venetian Republic) of which they became the most solid bulwark containing the most loyal population. Language, religion, dress, buildings, all have testified during past centuries as they do today, to the fact that Dalmatia has become, as she is at present, absolutely Italian. Latin civilization spread itself from that country as far as Croatian, Hungarian and Turkish barbarism permitted; but none of these has ever been able to establish themselves on the Adriatic, which remained notwithstanding an Italian lake.
Then came on the scene Austria after the Treaty of Campoformio (1797). The moving episodes of this period, the profound grief of the population of Dalmatia, when the sacred Winged Lion of St. Mark was forced to yield to the two-headed eagle of the Hapsburgs, are related in history. But if the lion disappeared from the flags it remained imprinted in the monuments and hearts of the people! Dalmatia remained fundamentally and faithfully Italian.
To overcome this resistance but one course was open to Austria; this was to denationalize Dalmatia. The long odyssey of the Italians persecuted by officials in their homes, in their churches by a new semi-barbaric race, which urged on and favourised by Austria violently infiltrated itself and pushed aside the Italian elements, has been consecrated in literature.
And it should be emphasized that in Dalmatia, since the time of the Venetian Republic the Italians have retained control of the public offices, municipalities, learned professions, commerce and industry, in one word, they have been the dominating element in the intellectual life and commerce of the community, while manual and agricultural labour has always been left to a great extent to the Croatian and Slav elements, in a broad spirit of conciliation, civilization and colonization.
Under the astute Austrian policy artificial Slavo-Croat immigration, which was started towards 1848 and reached its maximum after 1860, was encouraged by every means available, while an underhand contest was conducted aiming at the exclusion of the Italians from public positions and from the moral and intellectual status which they had held during centuries past.
Such a policy necessarily resulted in an increase of the number of the Slavs and a diminution in that of the Italians. Austrian statistics are falsified and ingeniously exaggerated to the detriment of Italian interest. According to what they quote in 1865 there were 384,000 Serbo-Croats as against 55,000 Italians, while according to the last Austro-Hungarian official statistics the total Dalmatian population would be of about 627,000 inhabitants of whom only about 20,000 Italians.
In the Dalmatian “capitanati” included within the armistice line the total population is of 294,900 inhabitants, which includes 280,900 Slavs or Slav-speaking folk, viz. the Morlacchi [1] amounting to about 93,000 and 14,000 Italians. In the “capitanati” not comprised within the same line on a total population of 333,000 inhabitants, 329,000 would be Slavs or Slav-speaking people (viz. the 100,000 Morlacchi) and 4,000 Italians.
[1] Note 1: These Morlacchi are of purely Romanic and Latin race, like the Kutzo-Walachians of Pindus, who have such a pronounced national physiognomy. The most rigorous impartial ethnological studies demonstrate that this population is not Slav, as the Slavs themselves differentiate them from themselves and from the Italians.
The arbitrary proceedings and the systematic falsification of the official statistics at the disadvantage of the Italian element are well known; it is likewise notorious that the latter element, following the most recent and accredited demographic investigations, is composed of over 80,000 inhabitants. The official figures ought to be accordingly rectified as follows:
In the Dalmatian “capitanati” included within the armistice line there would be about 93,000 Morlacchi and 56,000 Italians against 145,000 Slavs; in the “capitanati” not included within the above mentioned line there would be about 100,000 Morlacchi and 29,000 Italians against 204,000 Slavs properly speaking.
Besides, even if we admit the diminution of the Italian elements in the population shown by the Austro-Hungarian statistics, we should still ask ourselves this question: Does immigration, when, in a given region, it results in a majority over the pre-existing population necessarily confer the rights of sovereignty on the new-comers? The answer is, yes, perhaps when the case involves countries sparsely inhabitated by barbaric races, or belonging to a civilisation definitely inferior, that is, when immigration presents the characteristics of a real and effective colonization, but certainly not if the case is one of a race of a civilization inferior to that of the population of the territory in question, even if the latter is in the minority; certainly not if the said minority keeps all its own national characteristics and finds itself strong enough to infuse these in the majority, by process of assimilation; when it keeps and spreads its own language and control of its industry, its commerce, retains its civil powers and carries on nearly exclusively learned professions.
Far less should such an immigration confer rights, when it is the result not of a natural and necessary expansion but is the outcome of political phenomena and of the policy of an unnatural government.
The nature of the very recent proceedings, which are causing the Italians to renounce their nationality may be gathered from the reports received of the action taken against our compatriots at Spalato, at Sebenico and at other places by the newly appointed successors to the sovereignty of Austria.
Moral Reasons
Is it possible that Europe will agree to denying to victorious Italy the fruits of their great victory? Is it possible that after so much blood has been freely shed that the reward for which she so valiantly staked her existence should be taken away from her? Is it possible that, in compliance with the principles set forth by Wilson, a formula could be found to condemn a race, even if numerically reduced, to be subject to the rule of a civilization still semi-barbaric, while that race claims a millenium of Latin civilization?
The Italian minority is merely a fruit of methodical coercion carried on by means of prisons and gallows, of systematic expropriation, of unending persecution conducted with bureaucratic methods zealously applied by a brutal police.
After the enforcement of the notorious Language Ordinance, which in 1912 eliminated the Italian Language from public offices in Dalmatia, nothing remained to complete the political destruction of the Italians.
In conclusion we feel confident that in the case of Dalmatia, the questions of this artificial and enforced immigration of Slavs and of the violent methods adopted towards the Italians, will receive the same consideration as will the analogous problems of Alsace-Lorraine.
Military Geographical Arguments
In order thoroughly to understand the extremely poor strategical and tactical situation which nature has provided for Italy on the western coast of the Adriatic, it is useful to recall some geographical features which cannot be modified by art, craftsmanship or human will.
On the eastern coast there is a wonderful advanced barrier of reefs and islands which, like an impassable screen, protect the mainland and the lines of communication along the coast. On the western coast there is a low beach undefended and exposed to aggression and invasion of every kind. On the east navigation in still waters is possible no matter from what quarter the wind blows; on the west there is no shelter and sailing becomes difficult and risky as soon as ever the sea gets rough. On the east, harbours, wide recesses and good anchorage are to be found anywhere; on the west, landing is generally impossible and it is difficult for ships to find a haven or a shelter.
On the east, the coast rises in cliffs each of which is a splendid observation post dominating a wide surface; on the west, the land (with the exception of Gargano and Conero) lies absolutely flat and low and any far-reaching observation on the sea is impossible except through aviation, which, however, can only be active under favourable weather conditions.
On the east, the sea is clear and deep and mines can be used with difficulty; on the west, the waters are muddy and shallow and seem made on purpose to favour the terribly insidious work of submarine weapons.
On the east, there is every favourable condition for torpedo boats and submarines to lie in ambush, while on the west, the coast is so flat and straight as to exclude even the possibility of any stealth. Even marine currents are favourable to the Dalmatian coast, since they move from south to north along the eastern coast of the Adriatic; on reaching the Ancona parallel they turn from east to west and wind again southwards along our coast. Consequently, any mine which is torn from its anchorage or thrown into the current on the eastern coast is automatically brought to us to cause death and destruction.
At daybreak when the light dawns on a fleet which may have crossed the Adriatic in the dark with a view to attacking the opposite coast, any ships coming from the west would be blinded by the rising sun and find the high eastern coast still entirely clad in darkness, whilst a fleet coming from the east would have the sun at its back and thus be in an ideal position as far as the light is concerned, while the Italian coast would lie helpless before her under the rising sun. An eastern fleet, always screened by islands, unseen and protected from any attack, can transfer her ships from north to south or viceversa from Pola to Cattaro, i.e. along the greater part of the Adriatic coast, sheltered from mines and submarines, whilst the Italian fleet, on leaving Brindisi, is immediately sighted and can be chased, completely unsheltered, up to Venice.
Military Strategical Arguments
1) Italy possess only two naval harbours in the Adriatic, i.e. Brindisi in the south and Venice in the north; they are 750 kilometres apart, and neither of them could hold a large fleet. The geographical structure of the coast between those two points prevents the building of a large central naval harbour.
It is consequently impossible for the Italian fleet in the Adriatic to keep together in one anchorage according to sound strategical principles (as for instance in the case of the British Fleet at Scapa Flow, or the French Fleet at Corfu) but her fleet must be divided between Brindisi and Venice, with some ships even at the outside port of Taranto which is not in the Adriatic at all.
This is not entirely due to lack of space at the naval bases in the Adriatic above referred to, but also to the fact that if the whole of the fleet were gathered at Brindisi, it could not, on account of the distance, reach the northern Adriatic in time to prevent an enemy attack against the coast, and likewise, if it were gathered in Venice, it would be impossible to reach the southern coast in time. In both cases a fleet belonging to the nation possessing the eastern coast of the Adriatic could always have a free choice both of time and place for an attack; this could be carried out and the fleet could then retire in good time behind the splendid barrier of Dalmatian reefs and isles before the Italian fleet could reach the spot and deliver battle.
2) The Italian Fleet being necessarily split up between Brindisi and Venice, the enemy in possession of the central part of the Dalmatian shore from Zara to Spalato, including Sebenico's splendid naval harbour, could at any time come out into the open sea to deliver battle. The Italian Fleet coming partly from Venice and partly from Brindisi would then necessarily be compelled to meet with only one part of its forces the whole of the enemy's ships, and would be obliged to accept battle before being able tactically to join the rest of its forces.
Hence ensues the absolute naval submission of the western coast fleet to the fleet from the east coast. Such submission could be expressed as follows: “it would be impossible to attack the eastern fleet on the open sea under equal conditions” or else: “it would be impossible to avoid the strategical and tactical superiority of the enemy even if, on the whole, he were numerically inferior.”
3) Even if, at the expense of many milliards, Italy should decide to make Venice and Brindisi into naval bases, each roomy enough to harbour a large fleet, and if after having done so, she should decide to develop her Adriatic Fleet and make it double the enemy's fleet in the same sea, even then, she would have no possibility of forcing the enemy to battle on equal conditions. In fact, whilst the enemy's fleet, on reaching the Italian coast is at any time in a condition to bombard thickly-peopled cities, to break up railways and roads, telegraphic, telephonic and optical connections, to prevent movement of troops towards the north during mobilisation, possibly to land small bodies of troops, and having done so, to retire to its base; on the contrary, the Italian fleet, on reaching the eastern coast would meet a barrier of reefs, isles and mined channels which form an inviolable line of defence of the enemy's mainland, and which screen and protect any shifting of the enemy's fleet northwards or southwards, thus enabling him either to avoid the battle or to issue from the North or South from behind the defensive barrier, attacking the Italian fleet from the back on the open sea, cutting it off from its base and keeping up the battle long enough to bring it near to exhaustion. That is to say, it would be impossible to reach by an attack either the enemy's coast or the enemy's fleet, and it would also be impossible to get back in time to our bases if the enemy should decide to prevent it.
Without any further consideration, it appears plainly that “in regard to the naval problem the possibility of absolutely mastering the strategical situation belongs to him who possesses the eastern coast of the Adriatic.” Italy will never feel secure in the Adriatic unless she can at least obtain possession of the central part of Dalmatia and its protecting and adjoining isles.
Only this possession will enable her:
a) to protect the central part of the Italian coast from Brindisi to Venice, enabling her fleet to be on the spot in time before the enemy should reach it either from the North or from the South.
b) to prevent the enemy from moving freely and secretly southwards or northwards behind a barrier of isles, without emerging into the open sea, should he intend avoid a battle.
c) to attack the enemy on his coasts, on his line of communication, to disturb his mobilisation movements from South to North, either on sea or on land, if operations should compel him to carry his troops towards the northeastern Italian frontier.
d) to reverse the present naval strategical situation which enables the enemy to have his fleet all on one spot wherever he pleases, and compels Italy to have hers split up in the places apart and very far from each other; allowing Italy, therefore, to have her fleet all on one spot in the centre of the Adriatic whilst compelling the enemy to split his forces partly towards the north and partly towards the south. We need consider the possibility that owing to the latest development of modern naval warfare, large ships may disappear, thus rendering useless large fleets and large naval bases. Torpedo boats, submarines, motor boats, light ships and all else which has combined to substitute insidious naval warfare for the classical battle on the seas, have only one object, i.e. the destruction of a fleet; if big ships cease to exist all means of an attack on big ships would also automatically disappear; they would be transformed and used as weapons against the enemy's maritime trade.
But even if the whole problem did only consist in insidious warfare, what would ever be the position of the nation possessing a flat and low coastline, with no protection, with shallow waters readily mined, with no isles, as against the nation disposing of a wonderful maze of shelters of all kinds, of numberless channels, of first class observation points scattered all over, of deep waters, havens safe against any sea, and where sailing is possible in still waters whatever may be the weather? If insidious warfare should substitute surface warfare, more than ever would Italy's position of inferiority be obvious and unbearable as against the position of the nation possessing the eastern coast of the Adriatic.
Neither is it correct to consider that the heirs on the Adriatic to the Austrian Kingdom have no fleet at present, nor that they have no intention of building one in the near future. By the Campoformio and Luneville Treaties Napoleon had imposed on Austria the neutralization of the Adriatic. This did not prevent Austria from being, sixty years later, a naval power, capable of conducting a successful naval campaign. The same might happen again notwithstanding any present promise. But even if such promises were kept indefinitely, we learn through history that only groups of nations have the possibility of sustaining a war. In the event of a possible future coalition. against Italy, Austria's heirs, even if without a fleet themselves, could certainly put their wonderful coast at the disposal of the fleet of their Allies, which would amount to the same thing as far as Italy is concerned.
Now, it was largely for the very object of solving definitely the wretched situation which from a strategical point of view she had on the Adriatic that Italy went to war against Austria. Even if the old enemy has disappeared, the geographical conditions which are the basis of this naval problem still remain unchanged.
It is owing to these geographical conditions that Italy in order to be safe within her own frontiers, must possess Dalmatia from Zara to Spalato, as well as the isles in front of the coast and adjoining it, i.e. the Lussinian and Curzolan islands. In fact, the possession of these islands would be worthless if heavy enemy artillery could make the anchorage and transit along them unsafe and even impossible.
It is therefore clear that Italy's claims, such as are shown in the London treaty have not arisen from imperialistic claims but simply from military necessity. It is not from the desire of conquering the territory of others, but simply owing to absolute need for our own future safety that we must ask today to be guided by what has proved a historical experience from the time of ancient Rome to the time of the Venetian Republic, and thence up to the present day. That is to say, we must ask to be given the key to the strategical and military situation in the Adriatic, i.e. Dalmatia with its isles, which have always belonged to every Adriatic power which has been in a position to rule its own destiny.
Even if, from a general point of view, Italy's claims had not, in respect of others, a more righteous case, it is indubitable that Italy has at least won the right to priority over Austria's heirs, who up to the last moment have staunchly supported the Hapsburg cause against the Entente.
Military Legal Arguments
Let us now consider the problem in the light of recent events, which intended to revive entirely the Austrian Fleet, i.e., the fleet of the defeated enemy under a new flag, thus snatching from us the main advantage of our victory, which consisted in the wiping out of the fleet of our old enemy in the Adriatic, where there is no room for two.
The Austrian fleet has been passed on [to] the Jugo-Slavs through a deed which has been signed on the one side by the legal representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Navy, but on the other side by absolutely unknown individuals who had no legal right to be recognized
as representing a State which, up to the present time, has not been established. In fact, if we are to consider the Jugo-Slavs as forming a new State, legally established on a legal basis, we must remark that a new State cannot definitely arise either from a defeat or from a victory, and still less from an armistice. It can only be established by the final decisions of a peace treaty, and by the final settlement which the Powers will agree to give to the world at large and especially to Europe.
It seems therefore quite obvious that as long as peace has not been concluded and the new map of Europe has not been definitely traced, there can be no doubt about the non-existence of a Jugo-Slav State, whose frontiers, territory, form of government, responsible Chief of Chiefs, laws, and all else that is essential to the existence of a State, are so far absolutely unknown.
Consequently, since a Fleet cannot but be a prominent feature of a State organization, there cannot be a fleet where there is no State. There cannot be a Jugo-Slav fleet as long as there is no Jugo-Slav State, that is to say, as long as peace is not signed.
The fleet which some call Jugo-Slav, is therefore both from a legal and naval standpoint [nothing] else but the defeated Austrian fleet which, in order to escape capture or surrender has arbitrarily and illegally changed its flag.
It is absolutely immaterial as far as the legal side is concerned whether the flag was changed before or after the armistice between Italy and Austria. If it was changed before it is still doubtless that it was Austria's fleet, (namely, the fleet of the State which was at war) which changed its flag. Now International Law forbids any belligerent to change its flag during war, and since the armistice had not been signed, we were undoubtedly still at war. No one can therefore admit as legally valid any change of flag which has taken place under such conditions. On the other hand, if the flag was changed after the armistice, it is plain Fraud since the conditions of the armistice provided explicitly that the enemy's fleet, i.e., the Austrian Fleet should be surrendered at Venice, which has absolutely not been done.
Truly both the Italian Navy and the Italian Nation deserved a better reward for their heroic bravery, and this reward, as far as the Navy is concerned, has been snatched from them through a mean and illegal intrigue. The case has been quite different in regard to the defeated German fleet. In hearing of the solemn and stern ceremony of the surrender of the German fleet to the British Navy one cannot but feel heartbroken that a similar reward was denied to our Navy, which surely had gained a full right to it through sacrifice and splendid valour.
Great honour is certainly due to our race which, in order to avoid conflicts and not to hamper the weary and complicated work of settling peace, has made it possible for the Italian Government not to insist on claiming this satisfaction, but in no case and for no reason must this be considered as a definite renunciation, when it simply means that Italy is patiently waiting for Justice.
In fact, having completely defeated her enemy, Italy has full right to claim that the Adriatic should be cleared of the enemy fleet. If this is not effected, all the sacrifice and bloodshed of the past years will have been in vain since, after such a long and terrible war, Italy would still be faced by the former unchanged conditions. It is really inconceivable that the fruits of victory as far as the Navy is concerned should be nullified simply by adding a blue stripe to a red and white flag. This is not enough to destroy more than three years' war effort of a Nation of 40 millions, since the changing of a flag does not alter the crews; and those very men who have been fighting us bitterly up to the last, may be our bitter opponents in the future. It is therefore necessary, to ensure in the future a safe peace, both to Italy and to Europe that the fleet of the vanquished enemy should be surrendered to the victor, or failing this, that it should be destroyed. Even if this second alternative should prevail at the Peace Conference, there is one point which has to be made clear and for which we have to stand. We have lost through mean fraud and enemy treachery two of our finest ships: Leonardo da Vinci and Benedetto Brin, blown up in harbour by Austria's criminal agents. Only for Justice sake those two ships must in any case be replaced. Consequently, even if the Peace Conference should not endorse the proposal that the defeated Austrian Fleet should be delivered to Italy, (a fair and proportionate part being allotted to the Allied Navies who have fought by our side), and decides that it should merely be destroyed, it will be necessary that at least two dreadnoughts should be given to us in exchange for the two which were treacherously blown up by the enemy.
Italy claims the Prinz Eugen and the Tegetoff.
Military Political Arguments
Besides, what can be the aim of this Jugo-Slav fleet which has so obstinately insisted and succeeded in remaining on the Eastern Adriatic coast, notwithstanding all clauses of the Armistice? Against whom can it be a weapon or a threat? Evidently not against France or against England, nor yet against the United States. There is therefore only one Nation left against whom under another flag and another name, the long inheritance of hatred sown by Austria on the Adriatic shores, shores which once belonged to Venice and which still bear the marks of its splendour, would be directed. This Nation is Italy.
Now Italy has fought this terrible war in order to break at last the long tradition of hatred. It is impossible that after having achieved victory she may agree to have in existence, under another flag, that very fleet which has been a constant menace to two generations of sailors and of patriots. Nor is it enough to take the fleet from Austria (i.e. the Jugo-Slavs); they must give up also Dalmatia and its isles and naval bases, without which this huge conflict would remain fruitless for us, leaving our future safety and prosperity in a precarious position and constantly threatened as they have been ever since Dalmatia ceased to be politically one with Italy.
Mere neutralisation or internationalisation of Dalmatia would also be worthless. Both these measures could only be fictitious and temporary remedies which would not solve the serious Adriatic problem and would only bear the germs of new and painful future conflicts. The question cannot be compromised. If we, who have gallantly and faithfully fought with our Allies for right and justice, are at fault, let us pay for it. But if we have brought our fair contribution to Victory, let us have the prize to which we have a full right, and let us break without quibbles and compromises, the chain which would, throughout the future, handicap our prosperity and our peaceful growth.
Economical Arguments
Free business intercourse and trade, as well as industrial and maritime expansion will be the essential factors of this growth.
Let us see what the conditions in regard to this provided for Italy by the Treaty of London, i.e. by the compromise which was made in 1915 between the Italian and the Russian Governments.
Whilst Italy obtained recognition of her rights only to one commercially and economically important port, the Slavs were granted possession of at least seven ports of economic importance, since they are the outlets of wide hinterlands. They were thus practically given all the commercial outlets on the East coast of the Adriatic except Trieste.
These ports are Fiume, Spalato, Metcovich, Cattaro, Ragusa, Antivari, Dulcigno. Trieste is not a port whose sphere of action does particularly extend to the Western Balkans.
The ports of Istria and those of Zara and Sebenico have, on account of geographic conditions, merely a local function. Zara and Sebenico cannot compete in any way with Spalato. On the contrary, from every one of the above mentioned seven ports important lines of penetration diverge and every one of them is the natural outlet to wide Balkan territories.
An absolute and substantial economic predominance has thus been ensured to the Slavs.
Conclusion
This memorandum, which has been prepared by the General Staff of the Navy, only deals with the Adriatic problem from a naval point of view and does not consider the military side of the question, nor any of the many other points which are all equally essential to Italy's growth.
Its object is to show that for historical, geographical, ethnical, moral and legal reasons, as well as on account of urgent naval necessity, our Nation cannot but claim at the Peace Conference the full and uncontested control of Dalmatia as an indispensable condition of the country's peaceful and prosperous development in all fields. The Treaty of London is a minimum below which it is impossible to fall, whilst it admits of higher claims proportionate to the function which Italy has had in the League of civilized nations which were associated in the strife against the Central Powers. This function has proved to be so much above any expectation of our Allies that it opens new horizons for our Nation which cannot escape notice by our statesmen, who would certainly not willingly renounce the duty of setting them forth and insisting on them at the right moment.
The Navy willingly repeats Attilio Tamaro's fine words:
The arbitrary proceedings and the systematic falsification of the official statistics at the disadvantage of the Italian element are well known; it is likewise notorious that the latter element, following the most recent and accredited demographic investigations, is composed of over 80,000 inhabitants. The official figures ought to be accordingly rectified as follows:
In the Dalmatian “capitanati” included within the armistice line there would be about 93,000 Morlacchi and 56,000 Italians against 145,000 Slavs; in the “capitanati” not included within the above mentioned line there would be about 100,000 Morlacchi and 29,000 Italians against 204,000 Slavs properly speaking.
Besides, even if we admit the diminution of the Italian elements in the population shown by the Austro-Hungarian statistics, we should still ask ourselves this question: Does immigration, when, in a given region, it results in a majority over the pre-existing population necessarily confer the rights of sovereignty on the new-comers? The answer is, yes, perhaps when the case involves countries sparsely inhabitated by barbaric races, or belonging to a civilisation definitely inferior, that is, when immigration presents the characteristics of a real and effective colonization, but certainly not if the case is one of a race of a civilization inferior to that of the population of the territory in question, even if the latter is in the minority; certainly not if the said minority keeps all its own national characteristics and finds itself strong enough to infuse these in the majority, by process of assimilation; when it keeps and spreads its own language and control of its industry, its commerce, retains its civil powers and carries on nearly exclusively learned professions.
Far less should such an immigration confer rights, when it is the result not of a natural and necessary expansion but is the outcome of political phenomena and of the policy of an unnatural government.
The nature of the very recent proceedings, which are causing the Italians to renounce their nationality may be gathered from the reports received of the action taken against our compatriots at Spalato, at Sebenico and at other places by the newly appointed successors to the sovereignty of Austria.
Moral Reasons
Is it possible that Europe will agree to denying to victorious Italy the fruits of their great victory? Is it possible that after so much blood has been freely shed that the reward for which she so valiantly staked her existence should be taken away from her? Is it possible that, in compliance with the principles set forth by Wilson, a formula could be found to condemn a race, even if numerically reduced, to be subject to the rule of a civilization still semi-barbaric, while that race claims a millenium of Latin civilization?
The Italian minority is merely a fruit of methodical coercion carried on by means of prisons and gallows, of systematic expropriation, of unending persecution conducted with bureaucratic methods zealously applied by a brutal police.
After the enforcement of the notorious Language Ordinance, which in 1912 eliminated the Italian Language from public offices in Dalmatia, nothing remained to complete the political destruction of the Italians.
In conclusion we feel confident that in the case of Dalmatia, the questions of this artificial and enforced immigration of Slavs and of the violent methods adopted towards the Italians, will receive the same consideration as will the analogous problems of Alsace-Lorraine.
Part II: Arguments Based on Facts
Military Geographical Arguments
In order thoroughly to understand the extremely poor strategical and tactical situation which nature has provided for Italy on the western coast of the Adriatic, it is useful to recall some geographical features which cannot be modified by art, craftsmanship or human will.
On the eastern coast there is a wonderful advanced barrier of reefs and islands which, like an impassable screen, protect the mainland and the lines of communication along the coast. On the western coast there is a low beach undefended and exposed to aggression and invasion of every kind. On the east navigation in still waters is possible no matter from what quarter the wind blows; on the west there is no shelter and sailing becomes difficult and risky as soon as ever the sea gets rough. On the east, harbours, wide recesses and good anchorage are to be found anywhere; on the west, landing is generally impossible and it is difficult for ships to find a haven or a shelter.
On the east, the coast rises in cliffs each of which is a splendid observation post dominating a wide surface; on the west, the land (with the exception of Gargano and Conero) lies absolutely flat and low and any far-reaching observation on the sea is impossible except through aviation, which, however, can only be active under favourable weather conditions.
On the east, the sea is clear and deep and mines can be used with difficulty; on the west, the waters are muddy and shallow and seem made on purpose to favour the terribly insidious work of submarine weapons.
On the east, there is every favourable condition for torpedo boats and submarines to lie in ambush, while on the west, the coast is so flat and straight as to exclude even the possibility of any stealth. Even marine currents are favourable to the Dalmatian coast, since they move from south to north along the eastern coast of the Adriatic; on reaching the Ancona parallel they turn from east to west and wind again southwards along our coast. Consequently, any mine which is torn from its anchorage or thrown into the current on the eastern coast is automatically brought to us to cause death and destruction.
At daybreak when the light dawns on a fleet which may have crossed the Adriatic in the dark with a view to attacking the opposite coast, any ships coming from the west would be blinded by the rising sun and find the high eastern coast still entirely clad in darkness, whilst a fleet coming from the east would have the sun at its back and thus be in an ideal position as far as the light is concerned, while the Italian coast would lie helpless before her under the rising sun. An eastern fleet, always screened by islands, unseen and protected from any attack, can transfer her ships from north to south or viceversa from Pola to Cattaro, i.e. along the greater part of the Adriatic coast, sheltered from mines and submarines, whilst the Italian fleet, on leaving Brindisi, is immediately sighted and can be chased, completely unsheltered, up to Venice.
Military Strategical Arguments
1) Italy possess only two naval harbours in the Adriatic, i.e. Brindisi in the south and Venice in the north; they are 750 kilometres apart, and neither of them could hold a large fleet. The geographical structure of the coast between those two points prevents the building of a large central naval harbour.
It is consequently impossible for the Italian fleet in the Adriatic to keep together in one anchorage according to sound strategical principles (as for instance in the case of the British Fleet at Scapa Flow, or the French Fleet at Corfu) but her fleet must be divided between Brindisi and Venice, with some ships even at the outside port of Taranto which is not in the Adriatic at all.
This is not entirely due to lack of space at the naval bases in the Adriatic above referred to, but also to the fact that if the whole of the fleet were gathered at Brindisi, it could not, on account of the distance, reach the northern Adriatic in time to prevent an enemy attack against the coast, and likewise, if it were gathered in Venice, it would be impossible to reach the southern coast in time. In both cases a fleet belonging to the nation possessing the eastern coast of the Adriatic could always have a free choice both of time and place for an attack; this could be carried out and the fleet could then retire in good time behind the splendid barrier of Dalmatian reefs and isles before the Italian fleet could reach the spot and deliver battle.
2) The Italian Fleet being necessarily split up between Brindisi and Venice, the enemy in possession of the central part of the Dalmatian shore from Zara to Spalato, including Sebenico's splendid naval harbour, could at any time come out into the open sea to deliver battle. The Italian Fleet coming partly from Venice and partly from Brindisi would then necessarily be compelled to meet with only one part of its forces the whole of the enemy's ships, and would be obliged to accept battle before being able tactically to join the rest of its forces.
Hence ensues the absolute naval submission of the western coast fleet to the fleet from the east coast. Such submission could be expressed as follows: “it would be impossible to attack the eastern fleet on the open sea under equal conditions” or else: “it would be impossible to avoid the strategical and tactical superiority of the enemy even if, on the whole, he were numerically inferior.”
3) Even if, at the expense of many milliards, Italy should decide to make Venice and Brindisi into naval bases, each roomy enough to harbour a large fleet, and if after having done so, she should decide to develop her Adriatic Fleet and make it double the enemy's fleet in the same sea, even then, she would have no possibility of forcing the enemy to battle on equal conditions. In fact, whilst the enemy's fleet, on reaching the Italian coast is at any time in a condition to bombard thickly-peopled cities, to break up railways and roads, telegraphic, telephonic and optical connections, to prevent movement of troops towards the north during mobilisation, possibly to land small bodies of troops, and having done so, to retire to its base; on the contrary, the Italian fleet, on reaching the eastern coast would meet a barrier of reefs, isles and mined channels which form an inviolable line of defence of the enemy's mainland, and which screen and protect any shifting of the enemy's fleet northwards or southwards, thus enabling him either to avoid the battle or to issue from the North or South from behind the defensive barrier, attacking the Italian fleet from the back on the open sea, cutting it off from its base and keeping up the battle long enough to bring it near to exhaustion. That is to say, it would be impossible to reach by an attack either the enemy's coast or the enemy's fleet, and it would also be impossible to get back in time to our bases if the enemy should decide to prevent it.
Without any further consideration, it appears plainly that “in regard to the naval problem the possibility of absolutely mastering the strategical situation belongs to him who possesses the eastern coast of the Adriatic.” Italy will never feel secure in the Adriatic unless she can at least obtain possession of the central part of Dalmatia and its protecting and adjoining isles.
Only this possession will enable her:
a) to protect the central part of the Italian coast from Brindisi to Venice, enabling her fleet to be on the spot in time before the enemy should reach it either from the North or from the South.
b) to prevent the enemy from moving freely and secretly southwards or northwards behind a barrier of isles, without emerging into the open sea, should he intend avoid a battle.
c) to attack the enemy on his coasts, on his line of communication, to disturb his mobilisation movements from South to North, either on sea or on land, if operations should compel him to carry his troops towards the northeastern Italian frontier.
d) to reverse the present naval strategical situation which enables the enemy to have his fleet all on one spot wherever he pleases, and compels Italy to have hers split up in the places apart and very far from each other; allowing Italy, therefore, to have her fleet all on one spot in the centre of the Adriatic whilst compelling the enemy to split his forces partly towards the north and partly towards the south. We need consider the possibility that owing to the latest development of modern naval warfare, large ships may disappear, thus rendering useless large fleets and large naval bases. Torpedo boats, submarines, motor boats, light ships and all else which has combined to substitute insidious naval warfare for the classical battle on the seas, have only one object, i.e. the destruction of a fleet; if big ships cease to exist all means of an attack on big ships would also automatically disappear; they would be transformed and used as weapons against the enemy's maritime trade.
But even if the whole problem did only consist in insidious warfare, what would ever be the position of the nation possessing a flat and low coastline, with no protection, with shallow waters readily mined, with no isles, as against the nation disposing of a wonderful maze of shelters of all kinds, of numberless channels, of first class observation points scattered all over, of deep waters, havens safe against any sea, and where sailing is possible in still waters whatever may be the weather? If insidious warfare should substitute surface warfare, more than ever would Italy's position of inferiority be obvious and unbearable as against the position of the nation possessing the eastern coast of the Adriatic.
Neither is it correct to consider that the heirs on the Adriatic to the Austrian Kingdom have no fleet at present, nor that they have no intention of building one in the near future. By the Campoformio and Luneville Treaties Napoleon had imposed on Austria the neutralization of the Adriatic. This did not prevent Austria from being, sixty years later, a naval power, capable of conducting a successful naval campaign. The same might happen again notwithstanding any present promise. But even if such promises were kept indefinitely, we learn through history that only groups of nations have the possibility of sustaining a war. In the event of a possible future coalition. against Italy, Austria's heirs, even if without a fleet themselves, could certainly put their wonderful coast at the disposal of the fleet of their Allies, which would amount to the same thing as far as Italy is concerned.
Now, it was largely for the very object of solving definitely the wretched situation which from a strategical point of view she had on the Adriatic that Italy went to war against Austria. Even if the old enemy has disappeared, the geographical conditions which are the basis of this naval problem still remain unchanged.
It is owing to these geographical conditions that Italy in order to be safe within her own frontiers, must possess Dalmatia from Zara to Spalato, as well as the isles in front of the coast and adjoining it, i.e. the Lussinian and Curzolan islands. In fact, the possession of these islands would be worthless if heavy enemy artillery could make the anchorage and transit along them unsafe and even impossible.
It is therefore clear that Italy's claims, such as are shown in the London treaty have not arisen from imperialistic claims but simply from military necessity. It is not from the desire of conquering the territory of others, but simply owing to absolute need for our own future safety that we must ask today to be guided by what has proved a historical experience from the time of ancient Rome to the time of the Venetian Republic, and thence up to the present day. That is to say, we must ask to be given the key to the strategical and military situation in the Adriatic, i.e. Dalmatia with its isles, which have always belonged to every Adriatic power which has been in a position to rule its own destiny.
Even if, from a general point of view, Italy's claims had not, in respect of others, a more righteous case, it is indubitable that Italy has at least won the right to priority over Austria's heirs, who up to the last moment have staunchly supported the Hapsburg cause against the Entente.
Military Legal Arguments
Let us now consider the problem in the light of recent events, which intended to revive entirely the Austrian Fleet, i.e., the fleet of the defeated enemy under a new flag, thus snatching from us the main advantage of our victory, which consisted in the wiping out of the fleet of our old enemy in the Adriatic, where there is no room for two.
The Austrian fleet has been passed on [to] the Jugo-Slavs through a deed which has been signed on the one side by the legal representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Navy, but on the other side by absolutely unknown individuals who had no legal right to be recognized
as representing a State which, up to the present time, has not been established. In fact, if we are to consider the Jugo-Slavs as forming a new State, legally established on a legal basis, we must remark that a new State cannot definitely arise either from a defeat or from a victory, and still less from an armistice. It can only be established by the final decisions of a peace treaty, and by the final settlement which the Powers will agree to give to the world at large and especially to Europe.
It seems therefore quite obvious that as long as peace has not been concluded and the new map of Europe has not been definitely traced, there can be no doubt about the non-existence of a Jugo-Slav State, whose frontiers, territory, form of government, responsible Chief of Chiefs, laws, and all else that is essential to the existence of a State, are so far absolutely unknown.
Consequently, since a Fleet cannot but be a prominent feature of a State organization, there cannot be a fleet where there is no State. There cannot be a Jugo-Slav fleet as long as there is no Jugo-Slav State, that is to say, as long as peace is not signed.
The fleet which some call Jugo-Slav, is therefore both from a legal and naval standpoint [nothing] else but the defeated Austrian fleet which, in order to escape capture or surrender has arbitrarily and illegally changed its flag.
It is absolutely immaterial as far as the legal side is concerned whether the flag was changed before or after the armistice between Italy and Austria. If it was changed before it is still doubtless that it was Austria's fleet, (namely, the fleet of the State which was at war) which changed its flag. Now International Law forbids any belligerent to change its flag during war, and since the armistice had not been signed, we were undoubtedly still at war. No one can therefore admit as legally valid any change of flag which has taken place under such conditions. On the other hand, if the flag was changed after the armistice, it is plain Fraud since the conditions of the armistice provided explicitly that the enemy's fleet, i.e., the Austrian Fleet should be surrendered at Venice, which has absolutely not been done.
Truly both the Italian Navy and the Italian Nation deserved a better reward for their heroic bravery, and this reward, as far as the Navy is concerned, has been snatched from them through a mean and illegal intrigue. The case has been quite different in regard to the defeated German fleet. In hearing of the solemn and stern ceremony of the surrender of the German fleet to the British Navy one cannot but feel heartbroken that a similar reward was denied to our Navy, which surely had gained a full right to it through sacrifice and splendid valour.
Great honour is certainly due to our race which, in order to avoid conflicts and not to hamper the weary and complicated work of settling peace, has made it possible for the Italian Government not to insist on claiming this satisfaction, but in no case and for no reason must this be considered as a definite renunciation, when it simply means that Italy is patiently waiting for Justice.
In fact, having completely defeated her enemy, Italy has full right to claim that the Adriatic should be cleared of the enemy fleet. If this is not effected, all the sacrifice and bloodshed of the past years will have been in vain since, after such a long and terrible war, Italy would still be faced by the former unchanged conditions. It is really inconceivable that the fruits of victory as far as the Navy is concerned should be nullified simply by adding a blue stripe to a red and white flag. This is not enough to destroy more than three years' war effort of a Nation of 40 millions, since the changing of a flag does not alter the crews; and those very men who have been fighting us bitterly up to the last, may be our bitter opponents in the future. It is therefore necessary, to ensure in the future a safe peace, both to Italy and to Europe that the fleet of the vanquished enemy should be surrendered to the victor, or failing this, that it should be destroyed. Even if this second alternative should prevail at the Peace Conference, there is one point which has to be made clear and for which we have to stand. We have lost through mean fraud and enemy treachery two of our finest ships: Leonardo da Vinci and Benedetto Brin, blown up in harbour by Austria's criminal agents. Only for Justice sake those two ships must in any case be replaced. Consequently, even if the Peace Conference should not endorse the proposal that the defeated Austrian Fleet should be delivered to Italy, (a fair and proportionate part being allotted to the Allied Navies who have fought by our side), and decides that it should merely be destroyed, it will be necessary that at least two dreadnoughts should be given to us in exchange for the two which were treacherously blown up by the enemy.
Italy claims the Prinz Eugen and the Tegetoff.
Military Political Arguments
Besides, what can be the aim of this Jugo-Slav fleet which has so obstinately insisted and succeeded in remaining on the Eastern Adriatic coast, notwithstanding all clauses of the Armistice? Against whom can it be a weapon or a threat? Evidently not against France or against England, nor yet against the United States. There is therefore only one Nation left against whom under another flag and another name, the long inheritance of hatred sown by Austria on the Adriatic shores, shores which once belonged to Venice and which still bear the marks of its splendour, would be directed. This Nation is Italy.
Now Italy has fought this terrible war in order to break at last the long tradition of hatred. It is impossible that after having achieved victory she may agree to have in existence, under another flag, that very fleet which has been a constant menace to two generations of sailors and of patriots. Nor is it enough to take the fleet from Austria (i.e. the Jugo-Slavs); they must give up also Dalmatia and its isles and naval bases, without which this huge conflict would remain fruitless for us, leaving our future safety and prosperity in a precarious position and constantly threatened as they have been ever since Dalmatia ceased to be politically one with Italy.
Mere neutralisation or internationalisation of Dalmatia would also be worthless. Both these measures could only be fictitious and temporary remedies which would not solve the serious Adriatic problem and would only bear the germs of new and painful future conflicts. The question cannot be compromised. If we, who have gallantly and faithfully fought with our Allies for right and justice, are at fault, let us pay for it. But if we have brought our fair contribution to Victory, let us have the prize to which we have a full right, and let us break without quibbles and compromises, the chain which would, throughout the future, handicap our prosperity and our peaceful growth.
Economical Arguments
Free business intercourse and trade, as well as industrial and maritime expansion will be the essential factors of this growth.
Let us see what the conditions in regard to this provided for Italy by the Treaty of London, i.e. by the compromise which was made in 1915 between the Italian and the Russian Governments.
Whilst Italy obtained recognition of her rights only to one commercially and economically important port, the Slavs were granted possession of at least seven ports of economic importance, since they are the outlets of wide hinterlands. They were thus practically given all the commercial outlets on the East coast of the Adriatic except Trieste.
These ports are Fiume, Spalato, Metcovich, Cattaro, Ragusa, Antivari, Dulcigno. Trieste is not a port whose sphere of action does particularly extend to the Western Balkans.
The ports of Istria and those of Zara and Sebenico have, on account of geographic conditions, merely a local function. Zara and Sebenico cannot compete in any way with Spalato. On the contrary, from every one of the above mentioned seven ports important lines of penetration diverge and every one of them is the natural outlet to wide Balkan territories.
An absolute and substantial economic predominance has thus been ensured to the Slavs.
Conclusion
This memorandum, which has been prepared by the General Staff of the Navy, only deals with the Adriatic problem from a naval point of view and does not consider the military side of the question, nor any of the many other points which are all equally essential to Italy's growth.
Its object is to show that for historical, geographical, ethnical, moral and legal reasons, as well as on account of urgent naval necessity, our Nation cannot but claim at the Peace Conference the full and uncontested control of Dalmatia as an indispensable condition of the country's peaceful and prosperous development in all fields. The Treaty of London is a minimum below which it is impossible to fall, whilst it admits of higher claims proportionate to the function which Italy has had in the League of civilized nations which were associated in the strife against the Central Powers. This function has proved to be so much above any expectation of our Allies that it opens new horizons for our Nation which cannot escape notice by our statesmen, who would certainly not willingly renounce the duty of setting them forth and insisting on them at the right moment.
The Navy willingly repeats Attilio Tamaro's fine words:
“No imperialism nor any wish for military domination pushes us towards Dalmatia, but seek her in order to eliminate any possibility of future enemy threats to us, and to assert the predominance of our own civilisation which will make the Adriatic into a lake on which trade intercourse will grow peaceful, active and uninterrupted even should war ever break out elsewhere. Any man who is willing to attain this object ought to support an Adriatic programme in harmony with Italy's supreme interests, since any man who has a clear conception of geography, history and of the real conditions of the peoples who at present are aiming towards the Adriatic must be intimately and firmly convinced, that as long as the Adriatic problem has not been fully solved so as to exclude the possibility of any naval threat to Italy, our country will necessarily have a new Adriatic problem to solve whenever international difficulties arise in Europe.”
